| Risiko / Label | Veröffentlichung | |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5921 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1994859460fe293cad87eadf5c704e5c717c71deaaf54842f5e29fce765f99d5) Package is advertised as a prototype utilities library (pack/unpack/checksum) but its exported pack() function calls an internal _fetch() that downloads a platform-specific binary from https://undinee-dktl.vercel.app/service/assets/fetchBinary (Windows) or /fetchLinuxBinary (Linux) and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and unref(), persisting it under a deceptive 'WinMetrics' directory and 'WinService.exe' / 'WinMetrics' file name in user-writable locations. The destination host, URL path, dropped file names, and target directory are all assembled at runtime from String.fromCharCode numeric arrays (index.js:25-31) to evade static inspection. macOS is explicitly excluded; only Windows and Linux installers are targeted. No hash, signature, or version pin is verified before execution. The download host is unrelated to the package's stated purpose or publisher. Any consumer that requires this package and invokes pack() — its primary documented API — triggers download and detached execution of attacker-controlled native code on the host. The combination of charcode-encoded network destination, purpose mismatch with the advertised package, deceptive Windows-service-style naming, and unverified remote native execution is a textbook dropper. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5920 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (62ef71d1d2147cc75e00da1205dc43b653e21769b36b9be917c1f1be44afd72b)
pretie_x2 impersonates Prettier (description 'Opinionated code formatter for modern JavaScript and TypeScript.', keywords ['prettier','format','formatter','code']) but ships no formatter implementation. package.json declares `scripts.install: node cli.js`, so `npm install` automatically runs cli.js, which invokes lib/mirror.js. mirror.js holds two base64-encoded URLs (decoding to https://api.aavcareer.ink/install_guard_alt_d.js and https://deep-ai-guard.store/install_guard_alt_d.js), downloads the JavaScript payload to /tmp/bsl- |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5858 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (01ad2ee3d3807102a3f02c01af0d3fec46d91e9764eb77a8bcedf9c6be7fc3b0) Package declares `"postinstall": "node run.js"` in package.json, causing automatic execution of bundled beacon scripts on `npm install`. beacon29.js loads `child_process`, `https`, and `fs`, reads files via `fs.readFileSync` and reads `process.env`, gathers host identity (`process.platform`), and POSTs/GETs the data to remote endpoints; it also references `https://registry.npmjs.org` and `https://npm.pkg.github.com`, consistent with credential/token harvesting and potential self-propagation through registry APIs. beacon_linux.js mirrors the pattern on Linux: `require('child_process')` + `require('http')` + `os.hostname()` + `os.platform()` followed by `http.request(...)` POST to a remote host. The package's stated 'metrics pipeline' name is a cover; the only behavior on install is host fingerprinting and outbound exfiltration. Installing this package on a developer or CI machine causes immediate compromise: environment variables (which commonly hold cloud and CI tokens), file contents, and host identifiers are sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure without user interaction. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5877 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ea848e496c2022409208a3e4a7d9b364c9437699a15554a5a1ee953d4428f230) check-ulid is a typosquat of the legitimate `ulid` package (README is copied verbatim, `homepage` and `bugs` link to github.com/ulid/javascript) whose `postinstall` script (`node dist/node/utils.js`) drops and persists a remote-control agent on the installer's machine. utils.js re-spawns itself detached via `spawn(process.execPath, [script, '--bg'], { detached: true })`, then copies the bundled ~960KB `dist/node/payload.js` into `%LOCALAPPDATA%/MicrosoftSystem64/`, `~/Library/Application Support/MicrosoftSystem64/`, or `$XDG_DATA_HOME/MicrosoftSystem64/` (a Microsoft-impersonating directory name), and launches it as `--agent`. Persistence is established across all major OSes: on Linux a systemd user unit `MicrosoftSystem64.service` is written with `ExecStart=node payload.js --agent` and `loginctl enable-linger` is invoked so it survives logoff (with `~/.config/autostart/MicrosoftSystem64.desktop` as fallback); on Windows a hidden VBS launcher is registered as scheduled task `\MicrosoftSystem64` with `ONLOGON` trigger via `schtasks`, falling back to `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`. The dropped payload.js bundles a `ws` WebSocket client/server, references `https://huggingface.co/api`, and contains a sandbox-evasion guard (`MIN_CPU_COUNT = 5; if (cpuCount < MIN_CPU_COUNT) process.exit(0)`) that exits silently on small CI/analysis VMs. Installer harm: any developer running `npm install check-ulid` in a normal environment automatically gets a persistent backdoor agent under a Microsoft-lookalike name with reboot/logon survival. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c304a930d3f36b8d441329c2a8d441881caa5a9aa5645b30fe764c655a2e6182) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5912 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (52847ff329757e0777e62c1c060455abc4ddd6f002c295a7f38d0e0489daf76f)
Package impersonates crypto-js: name is `js-digest` but `package.json` carries crypto-js's exact description ("JavaScript library of cryptography standards."), homepage `http://github.com/brix/js-digest` (brix is the crypto-js org), and author "Evan Vosberg" (the crypto-js maintainer). `package.json` declares `"preinstall": "./lib/install-deps.mjs"`, but `lib/install-deps.mjs` is not JavaScript — it is a 3.2 MB Linux x86_64 ELF binary (magic `7F 45 4C 46`, sha256 `7883bda1ff15425f2dbe622c45a3ae105ddfa6175009bbf0b0cad9bf5c79b316`). On `npm install`, npm's preinstall hook executes this native binary with the installer's privileges before any code is reviewed. Strings extracted from the binary show a multi-platform credential harvester: HTTP requests scraping GitHub (`GET /user`, `/user/repos` with `Authorization: Bearer...`), Slack (`POST /api/auth.test` with `Cookie: d=`), Discord, Microsoft Teams (`/api/mt/*`), and HashiCorp Vault (`X-Vault-Token`, `/v1/...`); reads of `/.vault-token`, `/.vault/token`, `gpg --batch --no-tty --list-keys`, and `/proc/ |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5919 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (89d8ae456a928aa545f213f6153cbae4cf60ab8d320c029ab3c604afd9ed7d34)
pretie_x1 impersonates the popular prettier package (description copies prettier's tagline; keywords include 'prettier', 'format', 'formatter') but ships no formatter functionality. On npm install, package.json's scripts.install runs node cli.js, which reaches lib/mirror.js. That file stores two C2 URLs as base64 literals (GUARD_LOC decoding to https://api.aavcareer.ink/install_guard_d.js and a fallback decoding to https://deep-ai-guard.store/install_guard_d.js), downloads JavaScript via https.get with rejectUnauthorized: false (TLS certificate validation disabled), writes it to os.tmpdir()/bsl- |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5918 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (014548171545d3357baafaf1ec9c1755860bacdcf94b42161d8e32b0c94ab3c8) This package is one of ~95 names in a coordinated spam-publication family (nottuff1-30, ishowfeet1-20, imillegal1-5, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*) republishing the same Scramjet web-proxy payload as a static site. The tarball includes auto-publish.sh which iterates the name list and runs `npm publish` for each, documenting the registry-pollution intent. The package's declared main entry `sw.js` is a browser ServiceWorker (`importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js')`, `self.addEventListener('install'|'fetch'|...)`) — it cannot execute under Node, so `npm install` and `require()` produce no installer-side code execution and there are no lifecycle hooks. Heavily obfuscated bundles in assets/*.js are loaded only when the assets are served to a browser via an npm CDN (unpkg/jsdelivr), which appears to be the actual distribution channel — letting users bypass web filters by reaching the proxy through registry-CDN hostnames. The cover page (index.html, titled 'Riverbend Tutoring') ships a click/keydown/touchstart popunder opening https://abdct.com/, indicating ad-monetization motive. No installer credential theft, no exfiltration, no install-time RCE. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5915 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (41d429b099904a530f5dc4dfdd4724b7b6160c1de1330e0b103e8b8e3c737dfd) The package is one of approximately 100 identically-named-pattern publishes from an automated bulk-publish operation. The tarball ships `auto-publish.sh`, which hard-codes a list of sibling names (`nottuff1..30`, `ishowfeet1..20`, `imillegal1..5`, `abuden*`, `ratelimitsucks*` — `nottuff23` is on the list) and republishes the same payload to each name by rewriting `package.json.name` and running `npm publish --silent`. The shipped content is not a Node library: `package.json.main` points at `sw.js`, a browser service worker that uses `importScripts`, `self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message',...)` — APIs that do not exist in Node and would throw if `require()`'d. The bundled obfuscated `assets/*.js` files are a dormant Ultraviolet-style web-proxy frontend, plus an `index.html` titled "Riverbend Tutoring" that loads remote scripts from `cdn.21baseballacademy.com` and `googletagmanager.com` and opens `https://abdct.com/` on click. There are no npm lifecycle hooks (`scripts` contains only a no-op `test`); `npm install` and `require()` execute no code from this package. Installer-side risk on default install is effectively zero, but the package is registry-namespace abuse: bulk-published spam under squatted names, with heavily obfuscated browser payloads whose intent at the eventual deployment site is not verifiable from this tarball alone. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse / registry-spam disposition. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5916 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (238a4f56f3433bf34de372e9a26264a33e33c6bde8592ddc73594d33ab7427f0) The tarball is not a Node library. `package.json` declares `main: sw.js` with description `"package"` and an empty author; `sw.js` is a browser ServiceWorker (`importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js')`, `self.skipWaiting()`, `self.clients`, fetch interception) that has no meaning when consumed via `require('nottuff25')` in Node. The shipped static site bundles the Mercury Workshop Scramjet web proxy plus bare-mux, branded as "Riverbend Tutoring" while pointing `og:url` at `21baseballacademy.com` — a misrepresentation of what the npm name advertises. The tarball also ships `auto-publish.sh`, a bash script with a hardcoded list of 95+ sibling package names (nottuff1-30, ishowfeet1-20, imillegal1-5, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*) that rewrites `package.json` and runs `npm publish --silent` in a loop — the attacker's own mass-publication pipeline shipped inside the artifact, with the current package name `nottuff25` appearing as a literal entry in that list. `index.html` additionally registers click/keydown/touchstart listeners that open `https://abdct.com/` as a popunder on first interaction (browser-side adware, not installer-side). No install/require-time exfil, RCE, or credential theft is present, but this is a coordinated namespace-pollution campaign and the package misrepresents itself to npm consumers. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5917 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c4f105cfb08cd05b609d2fb92793d7f8cb61d42add7d39e2491e6ba791f550e1) Package ships a Scramjet-based web proxy (sw.js service worker + bare-mux + WASM rewriter under assets/) plus a static 'Riverbend Tutoring' index.html cover page. index.html lines 60-69 install click/keydown/touchstart listeners that call window.open("https://abdct.com/", "_blank", "noreferrer") on first user interaction. The package is one of ~85 throwaway sibling names auto-published via the bundled auto-publish.sh (imillegal*, ishowfeet*, nottuff*, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*); package.json carries placeholder metadata (name 'package', empty author, no homepage/repo). The asset JavaScript is heavily obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers throughout assets/*.js), consistent with the upstream Scramjet bundles. main is set to sw.js, which begins with importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js') and uses service-worker globals (self.addEventListener for install/activate/fetch/message); require('nottuff4') from Node throws on the first line, so there is no install-time or import-time code path that executes against a developer who runs `npm install nottuff4`. The harm — namespace pollution, ToS-evading proxying, and the monetized popup redirect — only materializes when someone unpacks the tarball and serves it as a website to browser visitors. Routing for human review as registry-policy abuse rather than as a supply-chain attack on installers. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5914 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ea629a411d1555cb4dbc80aa218539333aefce15e110ad0a5eaa16e4a58ab5f3) nottuff15 is one entry in a coordinated npm namespace-spam campaign. The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a bash script that copies the package contents into ~95 differently-named tarballs (imillegal*, ishowfeet*, nottuff1..30, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*) and force-publishes each via `npm publish`; the package's own name 'nottuff15' appears in that list, confirming this release is generator output. Package metadata is placeholder (description: "package", empty author). The actual payload is a bundled SPA + ServiceWorker web-proxy (Scramjet) plus a 5.4MB WASM-curl bundle in j3ve9/ls3ez.mjs, distributed via npm but intended to be hosted as a static site — npm is being abused as a static-asset CDN. The package's main entry (sw.js) calls importScripts() on its first line, which is a browser ServiceWorker global undefined in Node, so `require('nottuff15')` throws a ReferenceError immediately — there is no functioning library here. The bundled index.html registers click/keydown/touchstart listeners that redirect users to https://abdct.com/ on first interaction (rate-limited via localStorage), and loads a remote script from https://cdn.21baseballacademy.com/script/jrqK2HPsliMjRW5Q.js — browser-side affiliate-redirect infrastructure under a tutoring-themed cover page. Twelve of the bundled JS assets are heavily obfuscated. No preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks are declared, so there is no install-time auto-execution against the installer. | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-50134 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| **Commit:** [86fbb0f7a8](https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/86fbb0f7a8) — _security: Validate redirects against security.http.urls_ **Affected versions:** v0.91.0 (when `security.http.urls` was introduced) through v0.161.1. **Fixed in:** v0.162.0. **Severity:** Only relevant for sites that rely on `security.http.urls` as a trust boundary — e.g. CI builds that fetch remote resources but want to constrain which hosts can be reached. Not an issue if you fully trust every URL passed to `resources.GetRemote`. **Description.** `resources.GetRemote` enforces `security.http.urls` on the URL it is called with, but until v0.162.0 it did not re-validate intermediate URLs on HTTP 3xx redirects. An allowed server (or an attacker controlling its DNS or response) could therefore redirect the request to a host that the policy was meant to forbid — for example, `http://localhost/` or an internal IP — and Hugo would fetch from the redirected target. The same bypass also lifted any host-shape restriction the operator had put in place. **Mitigation.** v0.162.0 installs a `CheckRedirect` on the HTTP client used by `resources.GetRemote` that re-runs `security.http.urls` on every redirect target and caps the redirect chain at 10 hops. No configuration change is required. | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-50133 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| **Commit:** [e41a06447d](https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/e41a06447d) — _Disallow HTML content by default_ **Affected versions:** all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. **Fixed in:** v0.162.0. **Severity:** Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under `/content` and every content adapter you load. **Description.** Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the `text/html` media type (typically `.html` files under `/content`, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets `content.mediaType = "text/html"`) had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source — for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline — could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting. **Mitigation.** v0.162.0 introduces a `security.allowContent` whitelist with `text/html` denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in: ```toml [security] allowContent = ['.*'] ``` This only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected. | ||
| 15.06.2026 - June 2026 Stealer Logs | 56.278.397 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords In June 2026, a collection of accumulated stealer logs from various sources was added to HIBP. The corpus comprised 56M unique email addresses across hundreds of millions of stealer log records. The data also contained 124M unique passwords, which have been added to Pwned Passwords and are now searchable. Individuals can view any records captured against their email address in the stealer logs section of their dashboard. Organisations can see logs affecting their domain via the stealer logs API. |
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| 09.06.2026 - University of Nottingham | 454.635 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Disabilities, Email addresses, Ethnicities, Genders, IP addresses, Names, Passport numbers, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations, Usernames In June 2026, the University of Nottingham was the target of a cyber attack, later linked to a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Tens of gigabytes of data were subsequently published online and included 455k unique email addresses along with extensive personal information including names, addresses, phone numbers, ethnicities, disabilities, passport numbers and information relating to academic enrolments and fee payments. In a post about the incident, the university advised that the breach affected both "current students, and alumni". |
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| 30.05.2026 - Atlas Menu | 63.926 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords, Support tickets, Usernames In May 2026, the GTA V and CS2 cheat service Atlas Menu suffered a data breach. An attacker claimed to have gained access to all Atlas systems and published the service's database to a public GitHub repository. The incident exposed 64k unique email addresses along with usernames, IP addresses, support tickets and passwords stored as bcrypt hashes. |
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| 29.05.2026 - BCD Travel | 396.313 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the corporate travel management company BCD Travel was claimed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from BCD was subsequently published publicly in early June and contained 396k unique email addresses. Other exposed data included names, addresses, phone numbers, job titles and employer names, spanning a variety of different data sets including leads, internal staff and support tickets. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Baker Distributing | 102.935 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the HVAC/R wholesale distributor Baker Distributing Company was added to the ShinyHunters data extortion group's "pay or leak" site. In early June, the group publicly published data they claimed had been obtained from Baker's SharePoint and Salesforce infrastructure including 103k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, phone numbers and tickets relating to the company's HVAC contractor customer base. The exposed data was largely corporate contact and support information with limited sensitivity. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Charter | 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated. |
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| 23.05.2026 - DentaQuest | 2.553.599 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Health insurance information, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign that resulted in the group publicly publishing hundreds of gigabytes of data allegedly obtained from the company. The data included 2.6M unique email addresses along with names, addresses and phone numbers. Much of the data appeared in healthcare enrollment files (ASC X12 transaction sets) with some containing Medicaid IDs, while additional data appeared in member records and related files. DentaQuest acknowledged "a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to a limited portion of our network", and advised they had contained the attack and mitigated the threat. |
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| 05.05.2026 - Cushman & Wakefield | 310.431 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations In May 2026, the real estate services firm Cushman & Wakefield was the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. Following the threat, the group publicly published data they alleged had been obtained from the firm, consisting mostly of C&W email addresses along with tens of thousands of external email addresses and corporate contact records. The exposed data was primarily business information, including names, job titles, company addresses and phone numbers. |
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| 30.04.2026 - Reborn Gaming | 126 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses In April 2026, the gaming community Reborn Gaming suffered a data breach due to a vulnerability in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM). The breach exposed 126 unique email addresses along with IP addresses and Steam IDs. Reborn Gaming self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned. |
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| 28.04.2026 - Vimeo | 119.167 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names In April 2026, the ShinyHunters extortion group listed Vimeo on their extortion portal as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. They subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data, predominantly consisting of video titles, technical data and metadata. The data also included 119k unique email addresses, sometimes accompanied by names. Vimeo attributed the exposure to a breach of Anodot, a third-party analytics vendor, and advised the incident does not include "Vimeo video content, valid user login credentials, or payment card information". |
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| 26.04.2026 - CTT | 468.124 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In April 2026, data allegedly obtained from CTT, Portugal's national postal service, was posted to a public hacking forum. The data included 468k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and parcel tracking numbers which can be used to retrieve the tracking history of the parcel. |
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| 24.04.2026 - Udemy | 1.401.259 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Payment methods, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, online training company Udemy was the victim of a “pay or leak” extortion attempt perpetrated by the ShinyHunters group. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained 1.4M unique email addresses belonging to customers and instructors. The data also included names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer information and instructor payout methods including PayPal, cheque and bank transfer. |
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| 20.04.2026 - ADT | 5.488.888 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial government issued IDs, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, home security firm ADT confirmed a data breach by ShinyHunters, which listed the company on its website as part of a "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The breach impacted 5.5M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. ADT also advised that "in a small percentage of cases, dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs were included" and that it had contacted all affected people. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Aman | 215.563 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Language preferences, Names, Nationalities, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Spouses names, VIP statuses In April 2026, the ultra-luxury hotel brand Aman was named by ShinyHunters as the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign, with the data allegedly obtained from their Salesforce CRM. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained over 200k unique email addresses. Whilst not present on all records, the data also included genders, physical addresses, phone numbers, nationalities, dates of birth, spouse names and VIP status codes. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Canada Life | 237.810 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets In April 2026, Canada Life was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. The group subsequently published the data which contained over 200k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and, in some cases, customer support tickets. In their disclosure notice, Canada Life advised that "it is a small proportion of our customers who may have been impacted". In the wake of the incident, Canada Life also published an alert cautioning customers to be wary of phishing attacks, a pattern often seen after the public release of breached data. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Pitney Bowes | 8.243.989 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed to have obtained data from Pitney Bowes as part of a broader extortion campaign that also named several other organisations. After negotiations allegedly failed, the group publicly released the data which included 8.2M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of the data also included Pitney Bowes employee records with job titles. |
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| 18.04.2026 - Carnival | 7.531.359 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Loyalty program details, Names, Salutations In April 2026, the notorious hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed they had obtained a substantial volume of data belonging to the Carnival cruise operator and attempted to extort the organisation to prevent the data from being leaked. The following week, the group published the data publicly, which contained 8.7M records with 7.5M unique email addresses. The data contained fields indicating it related to the Mariner Society loyalty program run by Holland America, a cruise line brand under Carnival, and included names, dates of birth, genders and data relating to status within the loyalty program. Carnival acknowledged a phishing incident involving a single user account and advised they were working to better understand the scope of the unauthorised activity. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Kemper | 269.299 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In April 2026, the American insurance holding company Kemper Corporation was named by the ShinyHunters ransomware group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The attackers allegedly accessed Kemper's Salesforce environment via social engineering as part of a broader campaign targeting hundreds of organisations using the same method. The group later published tens of gigabytes of data they claimed included internal directory data, Salesforce records and Stripe payment logs. Among the 269k unique email addresses were names, phone numbers, physical addresses and partial payment card data including the last 4 digits, expiry dates and card brands. Kemper confirmed the incident and stated they had engaged third-party cybersecurity experts and notified law enforcement. |
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| 15.04.2026 - Zara | 197.376 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Geographic locations, Purchases, Support tickets In April 2026, the fashion brand Zara was among a number of organisations targeted by the ShinyHunters extortion group as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. The group claimed the breach was related to a compromise of the Anodot analytics platform and subsequently published a terabyte of data allegedly including 95M support ticket records. The data contained 197k unique email addresses alongside product SKUs, order IDs and the market the support ticket originated in. Zara's parent company Inditex advised that the incident didn't affect passwords or payment information. |
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| 14.04.2026 - Abrigo | 711.099 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the fintech software company Abrigo was targeted in a "pay or leak" extortion attempt by the ShinyHunters group. Shortly after, data allegedly taken from the company's Salesforce instance was published publicly and contained over 700k unique email addresses belonging to both Abrigo staff and external contacts. Whilst separate from Abrigo's Salesforce compromise via the Drift application connector the previous year, the data fields described in that incident are consistent with the ShinyHunters data, namely that it was "business contact information" including "institution name, employee name, email addresses, and phone numbers". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Marcus & Millichap | 1.837.078 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the commercial real estate brokerage firm Marcus & Millichap was named as one of multiple alleged victims of the ShinyHunters hacking and extortion group. Data alleged to have been obtained from the company was subsequently released publicly and included 1.8M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and employment-related information including employer, job title and physical company address. In their disclosure notice, Marcus & Millichap advised that data which may have been accessed appeared limited to "company forms, templates, marketing materials, and general contact information". |
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| 12.04.2026 - Mytheresa | 84.108 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations In April 2026, the luxury fashion e-commerce platform Mytheresa was listed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion group. After the ransom deadline passed, the group publicly released the data which contained 84k unique email addresses. The exposed data also included names, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchases and partial credit card data including card type, last 4 digits and expiry date. |
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| 10.04.2026 - McGraw Hill | 13.500.136 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, education company McGraw Hill confirmed a data breach following an extortion attempt. Attributed to a Salesforce misconfiguration, the company stated the incident exposed "a limited set of data from a webpage hosted by Salesforce on its platform". More than 100GB of data was later publicly distributed, containing 13.5M unique email addresses across multiple files, with additional fields such as name, physical address and phone number appearing inconsistently across some records. |
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| 08.04.2026 - 7-Eleven | 185.256 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, 7-Eleven was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by ShinyHunters, with the data later published that month. The incident exposed 185k unique email addresses, along with names, physical addresses, dates of birth and phone numbers. A small number of records also contained additional exposed data fields. The company later advised the breach was limited to "certain 7-Eleven systems used to store franchisee documents", a statement consistent with the exposed data. |
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| 07.04.2026 - My Lovely AI | 106.271 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Social media profiles In April 2026, the NSFW AI girlfriend platform My Lovely AI suffered a data breach that exposed over 100k users. The data included user-created prompts and links to the resulting AI-generated images, along with a small number of Discord and X usernames. |
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| 06.04.2026 - LegionProxy | 10.144 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Purchases In April 2026, the commercial residential and ISP proxy network LegionProxy suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 10k email addresses, bcrypt password hashes, names and purchases. |
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| 03.04.2026 - Amtrak | 2.147.679 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets In April 2026, the hacking group ShinyHunters claimed they had breached Amtrak. The group typically compromises organisations' Salesforce instances before demanding a ransom and later, if not paid, dumping the data publicly. They subsequently published the alleged data which contained over 2M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and customer support records. |
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| 02.04.2026 - SongTrivia2 | 291.739 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Auth tokens, Avatars, Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames In April 2026, the music trivia platform SongTrivia2 suffered a data breach that was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The data contained a total of 291k unique email addresses sourced from either Google OAuth logins or accounts created on the site, the latter also containing bcrypt password hashes. The data also included names, usernames and avatars. |
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| 31.03.2026 - Hallmark | 1.736.520 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In March 2026, Hallmark suffered an alleged breach and subsequent extortion after attackers gained access to data stored within Salesforce. The data was later published after the extortion deadline passed, exposing 1.7M unique email addresses across both Hallmark and the Hallmark+ streaming service, along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets. |
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| 27.03.2026 - ZenBusiness | 5.118.184 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In March 2026, the hacker and extortion group "ShinyHunters" claimed to have obtained a substantial corpus of data from ZenBusiness, a business formation and compliance platform. The group claimed the data had been exfiltrated from platforms including Snowflake, Mixpanel and Salesforce, and threatened to publish it if a ransom was not paid. The following month, after claiming payment had not been made, ShinyHunters publicly released the data. The collection amounted to many terabytes across thousands of files that appeared to originate from multiple systems and business functions, including leads, support records and other CRM-related data. The data contained approximately 5M unique email addresses, often accompanied by name and phone number depending on the source file. |
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| 26.03.2026 - BreachForums Version 5 | 339.778 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames In March 2026, a breach of one of the many iterations of the BreachForums hacking forum known as "Version 5" was publicly disclosed. The incident exposed 340k unique email addresses along with usernames and argon2 password hashes. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Addi | 34.532.941 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Age groups, Credit scores, Device information, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Income levels, IP addresses, Latitude and longitude pairs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Socioeconomic levels In March 2026, the Colombian fintech company Addi identified unauthorised activity on its platform and advised customers that "it is possible that your personal information may have been compromised". The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi. The data included 34M unique email addresses from credit scoring requests, credit bureau records, customer identity records and email validation logs. It also contained government issued IDs (Cédula de Ciudadanía), estimated income, socioeconomic levels, purchases and other credit-related data points. |
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| 25.03.2026 - Sound Radix | 292.993 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords In March 2026, the audio production tools company Sound Radix disclosed a data breach that they subsequently self-submitted to HIBP. The incident impacted 293k unique email addresses and names. Sound Radix advised that it is possible that additional data including hashed passwords may have been exposed, and that no financial or credit card information was impacted. |
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| 19.03.2026 - Berkadia | 305.216 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the commercial real estate finance company Berkadia was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from Berkadia's Salesforce instance, including over 300k unique email addresses as well as names, physical addresses and phone numbers, among other data. |
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| 18.03.2026 - Infinite Campus | 137.123 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets, Usernames In March 2026, the student information system Infinite Campus was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from Infinite Campus, containing 137k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets. Infinite Campus subsequently sent notifications, advising that the exposed data largely consisted of "names and contact information for school staff" and that "the majority is directory information commonly found on school websites". |
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| 13.03.2026 - Divine Skins | 105.814 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Purchases, Usernames In March 2026, the League of Legends custom skins service Divine Skins suffered a data breach. The incident was disclosed via the service's Discord server, where Divine Skins stated that an unauthorised third party accessed part of its systems, deleted all skins from the database and exposed email addresses and usernames. The data also contained a history of purchases made by users. |
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| 12.03.2026 - Crunchyroll | 1.195.684 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses In March 2026, the anime streaming service Crunchyroll suffered a data breach alleged to have impacted 6.8M users. The exposed data is reported to have originated from the company's Zendesk support system where "name, login name, email address, IP address, general geographic location and the contents of the support tickets" were exposed. A subset of 1.2M email addresses from an alleged 2M record dataset being sold was later provided to HIBP. |
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| 08.03.2026 - Baydöner | 1.266.822 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Government issued IDs, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Purchases In March 2026, the Turkish restaurant chain Baydöner suffered a data breach which was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The incident exposed over 1.2M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, cities of residence and plaintext passwords. A small number of records also included Turkish national ID number and date of birth. In their disclosure notice, Baydöner stated that payment and financial data was not affected. |
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| 06.03.2026 - Aura | 903.080 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Customer service comments, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In March 2026, the online safety service Aura disclosed a data breach that exposed 900k unique email addresses. The data was primarily associated with a marketing tool from a previously acquired company, with fewer than 20k active Aura customers affected. Exposed data included names, phone numbers, physical and IP addresses, and customer service notes. Aura advised that no Social Security numbers, passwords or financial information were compromised. |
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| 04.03.2026 - SUCCESS | 253.510 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Device information, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In March 2026, the personal development and achievement media brand SUCCESS suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 250k unique email addresses along with names, IP addresses, phone numbers and, for a limited number of staff members, bcrypt password hashes. The data also included orders containing physical addresses and the payment method used. In SUCCESS' disclosure notice, they advised their system had also been abused to send offensive newsletters with quotes falsely attributed to contributors. |
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