| Risiko / Label | Veröffentlichung | |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2025-1889 | gerade eben | |
| picklescan before 0.0.22 only considers standard pickle file extensions in the scope for its vulnerability scan. An attacker could craft a malicious model that uses Pickle and include a malicious pickle file with a non-standard file extension. Because the malicious pickle file inclusion is not considered as part of the scope of picklescan, the file would pass security checks and appear to be safe, when it could instead prove to be problematic. | ||
| Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2024-8309 | gerade eben | |
| A vulnerability in the GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchain-community version 0.2.5 allows for SQL injection through prompt injection. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service (DoS) by deleting all data, breaches in multi-tenant security environments, and data integrity issues. Attackers can create, update, or delete nodes and relationships without proper authorization, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, access data across different tenants, and compromise the integrity of the database. | ||
| Risiko 2 / 10 CVE-2026-113786 | vor 6 Stunde(n) | |
| ### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to arbitrary image parsers being called. This requires loading an image which claims to use the `/DCTDecode` filter (JPEG data). Users which do not have the optional *Pillow* dependency installed in their environment are not affected. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.21.1](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.21.1). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#4222](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/4222). | ||
| Risiko 5 / 10 CVE-2026-112948 | vor 1 Tag(en) | |
| ### Summary In Vitest 5, Vite's `server.fs.deny` is not applied as intended on Vitest's dev servers. Depending on the server, files that Vite refuses to serve by default (such as `.env`, private keys and certificates, `.npmrc`, and `.git`) or Vitest's own API token file (`.vitest-secret-token`) can be read over plain HTTP by a client that can reach the server. In Browser Mode with `test.projects`, a malicious website can also read `.env` values through the developer's browser. This only applies when Vitest runs an HTTP server, which happens with the UI (`--ui`), Browser Mode, or `api` enabled. Plain `vitest` and `vitest run` don't listen on any port and are not affected. The fix ships in `vitest`, and `@vitest/ui` and `@vitest/browser` are listed because they are what enables the affected setups. Both pin `vitest` to the same version as a peer dependency, so upgrading either one also requires the patched `vitest`. Users who enable `api` without `@vitest/ui` or `@vitest/browser` are also affected and should upgrade `vitest`. ### Details Vitest 5 adds its API token file to `server.fs.deny`, but neither server ended up with the intended list. That's because of two Vite behaviors. Vite applies its default deny list only when `server.fs.deny` is unset, and it compiles the list into a matcher during config resolution, so later changes to the array have no effect. | setup | listening server | Vite's default deny list | `.vitest-secret-token` | | ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | | plain `vitest` / `vitest run` | none | not reachable | not reachable | | `--ui` or `api` | root | denied | **served** (fallback location only) | | Browser Mode, single project | root (also the browser server) | denied | **served** (fallback location only) | | Browser Mode with `test.projects` | each browser project's server | **served** | denied | - **Project servers** set `deny: ['.vitest-secret-token']` from a `config()` hook, which replaces Vite's defaults. A project server listens on a port in Browser Mode with `test.projects`, so in that setup a request like `GET /.env?raw` returns the file. A plain `GET /.env` is also served as `text/javascript`, so a malicious page can include it with ` | ||