Beratung zu IT-Sicherheit & Datenschutz


Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung beziehungsweise das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz betreffen uns alle - jeder, der Daten von Dritten erfasst, speichert oder verarbeitet muss den europäischen Standard einhalten. Die umfangreichen Gesetzestexte regeln Rechte und Pflichten aber auch technische und organisatorische Maßnahmen zum Datenschutz, Aufbewahrungspflichten, Sicherheitsstandards und Vorgaben zur Dokumentation von Verfahren und Vorfällen sowie die Vorgaben zur Berufung eines Datenschutzbeauftragten mit einer besonderen Aufsichts- und Beratungspflicht.

Die DSGVO und das BDSG sollte dabei nicht nur schriftlich in langen Rechtstexten, Datenschutzhinweisen und Verfahrensdokumentationen umgesetzt werden sondern es sollten konkrete technische Standards etabliert und eingehalten werden um dem Verlust von Daten vorzubeugen, der unberechtigten Nutzung von Daten einhalt zu gebieten und Angreifer und Hacker zuverlässig abzuwehren.

Da umfangreiches Know-How sowohl im Bezug auf die Rechtsgrundlagen als auch auf die technischen Risiken und Möglichkeiten erforderlich sind um ein angemessenes Datenschutzkonzept zu etablieren haben viele Unternehmen große Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung. Unsere IT- und Datenschutzberatung setzt hier an - mit unserer Expertise können wir Sie dabei unterstützen Datenschutz technisch und rechtlich angemessen umzusetzen.
Wir unterstützen Sie gerne! »

  Unsere Leistungen

Datenschutzberatung durch geprüften DSB
Umsetzung von IT-Richtlinien / Gesetzen
Analyse & Beratung zur IT-Sicherheit
Erstellung von Dokumentationen



Was steckt dahinter?

Das "Who is Who" - DSGVO, GDPR, BDSG, TMG, ...
Innerhalb der EU gilt seit 2018 die sogenannte General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), die in Deutschland unter der Bezeichnung "Datenschutz-Grundverordnung" (DSGVO) in nationales Recht umgesetzt wurde. Das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) präzisiert die Regelungen der DSGVO und fügt weitere nationale Regelungen hinzu. Für Betreiber von Internetangeboten ist zudem das Telemediengesetzes (TMG) relevant. Dies bezieht sich allerdings weniger auf den Datenschutz als auf grundlegende Regelungen im IT-Recht.

Was ist Datenschutzberatung?
Unser TÜV geprüfter Datenschutzbeauftragter mit juristischer Qualifikation berät Sie gerne zu Fragen rund um die Umsetzung von Datenschutzrecht in Ihren konkreten Projekten. Darüber hinausgehende zivilrechtliche Fragestellungen hingegen fallen nicht in den Bereich der Datenschutzberatung.




Die rechtliche Seite: DSGVO

Die DSGVO beziehungsweise das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz stellen verschiedene Forderungen an Unternehmen und Organisationen die zwingend einzuhalten sind um rechtskonform Daten zu verarbeiten. Als Verarbeiter von Daten zählen Sie schon dann, wenn Sie die Daten von Mitarbeitenden oder Kunden erfassen oder speichern.

Damit gilt die DSGVO sowohl für Kleinstunternehmen und Vereine wie auch für große Unternehmen und global Player.

Während die gesetzlichen Regelungen in vielen Bereichen sehr präzise Vorgaben machen welche Dokumente und Verfahren es geben muss und welche Rechte, Pflichten und Fristen gelten, gibt es in vielen Bereichen auch große Unsicherheiten. Häufiger werden Maßnahmen gefordert die sich am Stand der Technik orientieren oder technische Notwendigkeit und Machbarkeit zur Maßgabe machen.

Im Rahmen einer rechtlichen Datenschutzberatung geht es darum Sie über Ihre Rechte und Pflichten als Datenverarbeiter zu informieren und gemeinsam zu prüfen und sicherzustellen, dass die geforderten Unterlagen und Prozesse korrekt umgesetzt werden. Wir zeigen Ihnen gernen auch Tools und Best Practices zur Umsetzung der Rechte Betroffener und Ihrer Pflichten als Verarbeiter.

Wir unterstützen Sie dabei den Überblick zu bewahren!

Die technische Seite: IT-Sicherheit

Während die rechtliche Seite sich viel mit Fragen nach Rechten und Pflichten, der Haftung und der Verantwortung beschäftigt, ist die technische Seite des Datenschutzes sehr viel präziser:

Wie verhindern Sie, dass Ihre Daten in falsche Hände kommen?

Sie sammeln und verarbeiten vermutlich jeden Tag Daten von Dritten und speichern diese in internen Tools, verarbeiten sie auf Ihren oder fremden Servern, übertragen Sie zu Dienstleistern oder bauen sogar einen wesentlichen Teil Ihrer Tätigkeit auf der Verarbeitung auf.

Ein potentieller Angreifer oder Hacker versucht stets den schwächsten Punkt zu identifizieren, um Zugriff zu Ihren Daten zu erlangen. Häufig nutzen Hacker dazu bekannte Sicherheitslücken nicht aktualisierter Systeme aus, suchen nach vergessenen oder auch versehentlich offen stehenden Türen oder greifen sensible Zugangsdaten ab, wodurch sie auch ohne große Anstrengungen unberechtigten Zugang erlangen und viel Schaden anrichten können. Dabei müssen Sie nichtmal das primäre Ziel des Angriffs sein, sondern könnten vermeintlich auch Opfer eines größer angelegten Angriffs auf mehrere Unternehmen werden.

Wir unterstützen Sie dabei, ein Sicherheitskonzept in Ihrer IT zu etablieren und die Angriffflächen zu reduzieren.





IT-Sicherheit - bleiben Sie auf dem Laufenden


Täglich werden neue Schwachstellen, Angriffs-Vektoren, Cyber-Attaken und Fehler in Software, Netzwerken und Infrastrukturen bekannt - teilweise betreffen diese nur bestimmte Softwarelösungen oder spezifische Szenarien, manchmal betreffen Sie jedoch auch ganze Industriezweige, weit verbreitete Arbeitsweisen und grundlegende Technologien wie bei Heartbleed (SSL) oder Log4Shell (Protokollierung). Ergreifen Sie Maßnahmen, um Ihre Infrastruktur und Daten sicher zu halten.

Gemeinsam erfassen wir, welche Komponten und Abhängigkeiten Sie einsetzen und überwachen die CVE und viele weitere Quellen um im Falle von Mängeln oder Angriffspunkten schnell handeln zu können.

Wir simulieren Angriffe und Testen Ihre Anwendungen, Webseiten, die Infrastruktur und Prozesse auf mögliche Sicherheitslücken, Mängel und Angriffsvektoren um Risiken fürhzeitig zu erknennen und Lücken zu schließen.

Wir implementieren aktiv Monitore und überwachen somit Anfragen um frühzeitig Angriffe und verdächtige Aktivitäten zu identifizieren. Verdächte Aktivitäten können zur Alarmierung oder zu automatischen Sperrungen und Ausschlüssen führen, um einen hohen Standard zu gewährleisten.


Den Bedrohungen der IT-Welt sind Sie nicht schutzlos ausgeliefert - es ist jedoch wichtig dem Thema IT-Sicherheit Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken, um einen verantwortungsbewussten und rechtskonformen Umgang mit Unternehmens- und Kundendaten zu gewährleisten.
Risiko / Label Veröffentlichung
Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2025-1889 gerade eben
picklescan before 0.0.22 only considers standard pickle file extensions in the scope for its vulnerability scan. An attacker could craft a malicious model that uses Pickle and include a malicious pickle file with a non-standard file extension. Because the malicious pickle file inclusion is not considered as part of the scope of picklescan, the file would pass security checks and appear to be safe, when it could instead prove to be problematic.
Risiko 9.8 / 10 CVE-2024-8309 gerade eben
A vulnerability in the GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchain-community version 0.2.5 allows for SQL injection through prompt injection. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service (DoS) by deleting all data, breaches in multi-tenant security environments, and data integrity issues. Attackers can create, update, or delete nodes and relationships without proper authorization, extract sensitive data, disrupt services, access data across different tenants, and compromise the integrity of the database.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-13777 vor 1 Stunde(n)
upshift-finance is a malicious npm package — a renamed repack of a brand-hijack squat of the legitimate scoped package `@augustdigital/sdk` ("Upshift" is the DeFi product name used throughout the real SDK, e.g. app.upshift.finance). Its published 1.0.0 body is byte-identical to `augustdigital-sdk` and ships the real SDK's README describing itself as the "August Digital SDK". It is one of three packages — with `augustdigital-sdk`, `upshift-finance` and `upshift-config` — published as first-ever releases from the sole freemail npm account `awugochogabriel` (awugochogabriel@gmail.com) within ~20 seconds of each other on 2026-08-10, an account with no relationship to August Digital's real corporate maintainers. The package body is a byte-identical repack of the genuine SDK (316 files; the shipped README even instructs users to `npm install @augustdigital/sdk`) with a single unconditional `postinstall` hook grafted onto the manifest. On `npm install` the hook runs an inline `node -e` script that issues an HTTPS GET to `https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/` carrying `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, the package name/version and an ISO timestamp, wrapped in try/catch so failures are silent. The endpoint is a Cloudflare Workers subdomain deliberately named to impersonate build/CDN health infrastructure and is disclosed nowhere in the README, package.json or LICENSE, with no opt-out. Analysis of the bundled `lib/` found only legitimate chain RPC/explorer endpoints and no second stage or credential-reading code; the injected postinstall beacon is the sole malicious behavior. Hosts that installed it have leaked their hostname, username and working-directory path to the attacker and should treat that data as disclosed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (94fc7311cd8077196ad3ded7fe202f120fa465238fb45a741a8a4224b1c1cb84) The package.json postinstall hook runs automatically on npm install and issues an HTTPS GET to https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/ carrying the installer's os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and process.cwd() alongside the package name and version. The destination is an anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomain whose naming ('build-metrics-collector', 'cdn-ops-health') does not correspond to the declared publisher domains (augustdigital.io, fractalprotocol.org, upshift.finance) and is not disclosed as telemetry. The collected fields are host identifiers, not anonymous install counts, and are transmitted with no opt-out. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0dfffeb85c895bd3f636675777d42b12186031bd4eee864ce9e093696c1e7e0a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-13776 vor 1 Stunde(n)
upshift-config is a malicious npm package — a renamed repack of a brand-hijack squat of the legitimate scoped package `@augustdigital/sdk`. The version 0.5.14 is fabricated to imply a release history the package does not have (it is a first-ever publish). Its body is byte-identical to `augustdigital-sdk` and ships the real SDK's README describing itself as the "August Digital SDK". It is one of three packages — with `augustdigital-sdk`, `upshift-finance` and `upshift-config` — published as first-ever releases from the sole freemail npm account `awugochogabriel` (awugochogabriel@gmail.com) within ~20 seconds of each other on 2026-08-10, an account with no relationship to August Digital's real corporate maintainers. The package body is a byte-identical repack of the genuine SDK (316 files; the shipped README even instructs users to `npm install @augustdigital/sdk`) with a single unconditional `postinstall` hook grafted onto the manifest. On `npm install` the hook runs an inline `node -e` script that issues an HTTPS GET to `https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/` carrying `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, the package name/version and an ISO timestamp, wrapped in try/catch so failures are silent. The endpoint is a Cloudflare Workers subdomain deliberately named to impersonate build/CDN health infrastructure and is disclosed nowhere in the README, package.json or LICENSE, with no opt-out. Analysis of the bundled `lib/` found only legitimate chain RPC/explorer endpoints and no second stage or credential-reading code; the injected postinstall beacon is the sole malicious behavior. Hosts that installed it have leaked their hostname, username and working-directory path to the attacker and should treat that data as disclosed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (995333c28d95e45da0e7479b0c572ee1469c50a65e5d56593df831c76bcd3908) package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that runs an inline Node one-liner performing an HTTPS GET to https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/ with a URL-encoded JSON payload containing os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), a timestamp, and the package name/version. Errors are swallowed in a try/catch. The destination host does not match the package's stated publisher domains (augustdigital.io, upshift.finance, fractalprotocol.org) and is a generically-named Cloudflare Workers subdomain. On every npm install, installer-identifying reconnaissance data is transmitted to a third-party endpoint with no disclosure or opt-out. ## Source: ghsa-malware (54aee59b506f0aec1f4d0e596c24f83d3b983271bc361ae9232cdd7d98e62cd6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-17406 vor 1 Stunde(n)
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: spencer-baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.4. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (07fb7412ff24a83e6ee6af840ab987d9e7fb3fb95ed5f665907de73906d628f3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-19014 vor 1 Stunde(n)
shadowmd-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/newsletter.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for the channel ID(s) 120363407277177688@newsletter, 120363423975826201@newsletter, using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (2589939c6ffa672026365968e2af6a9fef2cedf0376e7c2fd1aba74daa97f8ad) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-17405 vor 1 Stunde(n)
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: shadowmd (npm), version(s): 8.6.87. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (926dc7dcc164af51175755e81a7a6eabb878244ecc173974ab577a1569ce1ff4) lib/Socket/messages-send.js at lines 425 and 436 reconstructs the URL https://fiora.nixel.my.id/ from a String.fromCharCode decimal-ASCII array rather than a plain string literal. The host is assembled inside the package's WhatsApp socket message-send code path, so on every message-send flow the runtime resolves to an off-host destination whose identity is hidden from source-level inspection. Obfuscated destination reconstruction in a messaging library's send path is the fingerprint of a Baileys-family fork that intercepts or mirrors session/message data through an author-controlled endpoint; the destination fiora.nixel.my.id is unrelated to the WhatsApp protocol and is not documented as a caller-configurable endpoint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (545a032df78ded68994cfb1a80039b785f8398a1488f44bd20c1c117aa8991e4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-3618 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (a86ee27e683fbf240067859bc76a4b902dd0ce3d1f8c4c22b0694ffa85e58db4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (31248312aa36cca999d7f40ba478d484be495b350e0858850baf3a9a6bf15630) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'mimecast-web-components' @ 2.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-17394 vor 1 Stunde(n)
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: kasabaileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0, 0.3.15. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (d37017e64a3cc849ef083cc69e78e783a86b830ffc3e4bf1fe308742d8316548) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-5528 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (aac4806dc5c887c91db1f2570abcae5b98d62dfae36bea2ddb9e2449efd62eca) Package name and description impersonate the popular `events` package (Node's event emitter for all engines). The vendored `events.js` adds an undocumented branch in `EventEmitter.prototype.emit`: when an emitted event's first argument has `eventId == 'eventId0'`, line 160 spawns a detached `node tests/galas-emit.min.js` with `stdio: 'ignore'` and `windowsHide: true`. tests/galas-emit.min.js is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style string-array indirection, base64-encoded RPC URLs and contract address) and performs three hostile actions: (1) connects to Ethereum Sepolia via Infura/Alchemy and calls `getCwPrivatePublic` / `getTData1` / `getTData2` on contract `0x661e50E19f05E3c0d04fD75891456D1F0A24508D`, AES-GCM/PBKDF2-decrypts the returned ciphertext, writes it to `tests/galas.min.js`, `chmodSync` 755 and executes it with `process.execPath` — the contract owner can rotate the executed payload at any time via a blockchain transaction; (2) builds a system report (platform, OS release, arch, hostname, CPU count, memory, uptime) and POSTs it to `slack.com/api/chat.postMessage` with hardcoded bot token `xoxb-11307403103236-...` and to `api.telegram.org/bot8961878831:.../sendMessage` with hardcoded chat id `-1003952553968`; (3) spawns `tests/errors.min.js`, which polls `conversations.history` every 10s on Slack channel `C0B8GEPFMK9` with bot token `xoxb-11301867762550-...`, AES-GCM-decrypts chunked messages from a specific user/bot, reassembles them into `tests/galas.min.js`, chmods 755 and executes it — a persistent post-install RCE channel. A magic `exitexitexit` message triggers anti-forensics: `fs.unlinkSync` of `events.js`, `galas-emit.min.js`, `errors.min.js`, `galas.min.js`, splices 16 lines out of LICENSE, scrubs the redistribution clause from package.json, and issues `taskkill /PID /T /F` (Windows) or SIGTERM (Unix). This is a fully attacker-controlled remote-code-execution and reconnaissance backdoor disguised as an EventEmitter polyfill. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d257fbb98fdf46bd50097486a99ebbe024faf9838deaca46cdda9a67fd154aea) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-13774 vor 1 Stunde(n)
augustdigital-sdk is a malicious npm package — an unscoped brand-hijack of the legitimate, actively-maintained scoped package `@augustdigital/sdk`. Version 8.20.1 was copied verbatim from the genuine `@augustdigital/sdk@8.20.1` release (published ~2 hours earlier) to masquerade as a legitimate mirror or re-release. It is one of three packages — with `augustdigital-sdk`, `upshift-finance` and `upshift-config` — published as first-ever releases from the sole freemail npm account `awugochogabriel` (awugochogabriel@gmail.com) within ~20 seconds of each other on 2026-08-10, an account with no relationship to August Digital's real corporate maintainers. The package body is a byte-identical repack of the genuine SDK (316 files; the shipped README even instructs users to `npm install @augustdigital/sdk`) with a single unconditional `postinstall` hook grafted onto the manifest. On `npm install` the hook runs an inline `node -e` script that issues an HTTPS GET to `https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/` carrying `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, the package name/version and an ISO timestamp, wrapped in try/catch so failures are silent. The endpoint is a Cloudflare Workers subdomain deliberately named to impersonate build/CDN health infrastructure and is disclosed nowhere in the README, package.json or LICENSE, with no opt-out. Analysis of the bundled `lib/` found only legitimate chain RPC/explorer endpoints and no second stage or credential-reading code; the injected postinstall beacon is the sole malicious behavior. Hosts that installed it have leaked their hostname, username and working-directory path to the attacker and should treat that data as disclosed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1c0362677faae34af2e3540e4f2e59430f82bbc585ae0f75a403b71ddb7d2fbc) package.json declares a postinstall script that runs an inline `node -e` invoking `https.get` against `https://build-metrics-collector.cdn-ops-health.workers.dev/npm-install/` with a URL-encoded JSON payload containing `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, and the package name/version/timestamp. The destination is a generic Cloudflare Workers subdomain unrelated to the package's declared publisher (augustdigital.io / fractalprotocol.org). Errors are swallowed so the beacon is silent. Host and user identifiers are transmitted to a non-publisher endpoint automatically on `npm install`, without disclosure or opt-out. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ac9213464f0a4118102a8046cbe93a27261b4a799fd308402f3c1cbbceba7e53) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2025-152975 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d988fc7cc31dcb19c921de81fcbf56b4e66be07ab5ffb9815f602eddfe00e9e5) This package appears to be part of the tea.xyz token reward campaign that flooded npm. These packages typically contain autopublish scripts (auto.js, autopublish.js, autopublish2.js, autopublish3.js) designed to automatically generate and publish derivative packages with randomized names to inflate developer reputation scores for tea protocol token rewards. The malicious payload modifies package.json to remove private flags, changes version numbers, generates random Indonesian-themed package names (some variants are also in English), and continuously republishes variants to pollute the npm registry. ## Source: ghsa-malware (282334e0604116d5f77c57c7e7c3c06f8f2f05cda7691cefd35608770b49b2c9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-18600 vor 1 Stunde(n)
Malicious package. `@ubedsockets/baileys` is a trojanized fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library (@whiskeysockets/baileys). On connection it issues an authenticated `w:mex` newsletter FOLLOW mutation (query_id 7871414976211147) that silently subscribes every victim to attacker-controlled WhatsApp channels — hardcoded newsletter JIDs: 120363410154606795@newsletter, 120363423295236859@newsletter. Legitimate Baileys never hardcodes a channel JID or auto-follows on connect; all published versions are malicious. Detected by wormsign static analysis of the injected channel-subscription code. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3f2be0d76cf2f992588fc8c354387b055942990224579ba9b8c66aa5ce725ed2) This fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library declares `dependencies.libsignal` as `github:rexxzyid/libsignal-node` with no commit SHA, tag, or version constraint. `npm install` resolves this reference to whatever the mutable branch currently points at and executes any lifecycle scripts in that tree, so whoever controls the `rexxzyid/libsignal-node` repository controls code that runs on every installer, with no integrity check and no review path. The package also contains an IP-locked kill switch in the main `makeWASocket` factory: a top-level `verifyIP()` call queries `api.ipify.org` and invokes `process.exit(1)` unless the installer's public IP matches one of two hardcoded values (`20.207.192.84`, `173.212.202.60`), terminating the host process for all other users on socket initialization. The combination — an off-registry mutable dependency source as the main crypto component and a hostile denial-of-use primitive wired into the exported entry point — is incompatible with a trustworthy library release. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8275f8031fa3107581c434b95b2cd539d5d19b6f72a4deeefcc45c111088e7ea) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-18681 vor 1 Stunde(n)
@sakataa/baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/newsletter.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for the channel ID(s) 120363408893555851@newsletter, 120363424295522327@newsletter, 120363426470081124@newsletter, 120363427718144294@newsletter (stored base64-encoded), using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (4abcf18dd6035677a062b94d9f59970622c3ca9af7a1dd7c0994c8402f61fc41) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-3507 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7e59a7d55636b02d0a28954889c22f021de5b4f33c525ce7712706df60cd9af3) The package @mimecast-ui/components was found to contain malicious code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (989196bbcf574597ffacc39076fdec0d8d906690cdda9f8700739b1ca8b831fc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (a8bd78a0c0e2baca560a44d5047bc0414e53cea80e7a97f0d37a109025bba99f) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@mimecast-ui/components' @ 2.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-3506 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e603deff481f2fdd492adde6f7d1f060fa7aa7d15f63abc4cc43fa7782409705) The package @mimecast-ui/charts was found to contain malicious code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (389dc410c54cc2be616ef0e9ae614cfa43916a82e929008facec67bc8c821e05) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (831be2c3e6c9885c479ff2920f4f2bd45a313483073af42ed59ba0ac78a98e3b) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@mimecast-ui/charts' @ 2.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-18854 vor 1 Stunde(n)
@kasabaileys/baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/newsletter.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for the channel ID(s) 120363431179022660@newsletter, using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (53e56b8186f209cd70c544cf761cc405d6128314d14c776dbfe5f8fbaf818b25) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-19987 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (a760e4e0dcb3e29901293efe6342561d33807eea25f3a7eae464f52739f93e93) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-19988 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (49d9b2c51cb82040a2e1f1dc0741e53700abea7af308af65caba3da2bb38469a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-19986 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (29cf15b774552a0a82b25629237308dbc5606a604056b14e3c8b4020a183a053) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Risiko ? / 10 MAL-2026-19981 vor 1 Stunde(n)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (48bbb16a8097814584ea8ee78855d49051b0ad554193bc28853a20749c4e79f8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Das "CVE"-Repository (eng. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) stellt eine Liste bekannter Schwachstellen und Sicherheitslücken in IT-Systemen unter Führung des "US-amerikanischen National Cybersecurity" zusammen und bewertet diese anhand Ihres Risikos auf einer Skala von eins bis zehn.


Gerade im Bereich von Web-Technologien und Cloud-Software werden regelmäßig Hacks und Sicherheitslücken bekannt. Die betroffenen Unternehmen erleiden in der Regel nicht nur einen Image-Schaden sondern stehen womöglich gegenüber Ihren Kunden auch in der rechtlichen Verantwortung. Das Projekt "Have I Been Pwned" sammelt seit Jahren Daten die aus Hacks oder Datenlecks öffentlich zugänglich werden und bietet einen Service um zu prüfen, ob man selbst von diesen Hacks betroffen wurde.

12.11.2026 - CastleRAT 179.745 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Passwords

In November 2026, Europol and international law enforcement partners dismantled infrastructure supporting several malware operations. Among them was CastleRAT, a remote access trojan (RAT) that enabled criminals to remotely control infected computers. Europol provided HIBP with 180k email addresses associated with CastleRAT infections, along with 893k unique passwords observed more than 3M times across accounts used on infected computers. The passwords are now searchable via Pwned Passwords.
04.10.2026 - Double Counter 274.922 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Geographic locations, Names, Usernames

In October 2026, the Discord server protection service Double Counter suffered a data breach attributed to a vulnerability in the Metabase analytics tool. In its disclosure notice, Double Counter advised that attackers gained access to a subset of its data. A corpus of data was subsequently published publicly and contained 275k unique email addresses and Discord usernames. A small number of records belonging to paying subscribers whose purchases were processed via Stripe were also present and included names, countries and postcodes.
09.09.2026 - AfD 345.439 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Email messages

In September 2026, the German political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) suffered a data breach which exposed 345k unique email addresses. The following month, hundreds of gigabytes of data containing hundreds of thousands of emails and attachments was published online, with searchable AI-generated summaries and downloadable original files. An analysis of the incident reported that the breach was detected as early as 9 September, with a subsequent intrusion occurring five days later. In its public statement, AfD attributed the breach to an attack on a hosting provider, identified in subsequent reporting as the party-owned Alternita Dienstleistungs GmbH.
07.09.2026 - Medela 423.947 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets

In September 2026, Swiss medical device company Medela was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The data allegedly obtained in the breach was later published publicly and included 424k unique email addresses belonging predominantly to healthcare professionals, Medela staff and leads. The exposed data consisted primarily of corporate contact information, including names, physical addresses and phone numbers, with some records also containing associated support tickets.
29.08.2026 - Neogen 435.963 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations

In August 2026, the food and animal safety organisation Neogen was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The group later published data it claimed had been obtained from Neogen. The data consisted largely of corporate contact records and included 436k unique email addresses from mailing lists, employee records and other contacts.
27.08.2026 - Manchester Airports Group 8.849.657 Datensätze geleaked
Browser user agent details, Email addresses, Geographic locations, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Purchases, Vehicle registration plates

In August 2026, Manchester Airports Group (MAG) disclosed a data breach impacting their services. The incident was later claimed by the FulcrumSec hacking group, who subsequently published email addresses and phone numbers relating to 8.8M customers of Manchester, Stansted and East Midlands airports. The data contained personal information relating to airport services, including vehicle registrations and parking history, Fast Track purchases and lounge bookings. In their disclosure notice, MAG advised that "at no point has passenger safety or aviation security been compromised".
21.08.2026 - McKesson 6.404.340 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Employers, Genders, Names, Personal health data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In August 2026, healthcare and pharmaceutical company McKesson was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published a substantial corpus of data they alleged was sourced from the company, which included 6.4M unique email addresses among other personal and corporate data attributes. The impacted data related to a range of individuals and roles, including marketing campaign recipients, patients, staff and healthcare provider contacts. In McKesson's disclosure notice, the company advised it had identified unauthorised access to "certain third-party applications and the exfiltration of certain data was associated with a subset of customers within our Oncology & Multispecialty and Medical-Surgical business units", but had "reasonable assurance of no ongoing unauthorized activity".
15.08.2026 - Oz Hair and Beauty 1.988.331 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Geographic locations, Names, Phone numbers, Purchases

In August 2026, Australian beauty retailer Oz Hair and Beauty was the target of an xpl0itrs extortion attack. The group subsequently published data allegedly obtained from the company, which included 2M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, geographic locations (suburb and postcode) and purchases.
13.08.2026 - Carhartt 12.933.413 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In August 2026, clothing retailer Carhartt was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly obtained from the company including 12.9M unique email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses. The published corpus also contained millions of synthetic records that did not relate to real individuals and were excluded from the breach.
12.08.2026 - Sharecare 318.185 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Employers, Genders, Government issued IDs, Job titles, Marital statuses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In August 2026, the digital health company Sharecare was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data it claimed was taken from Sharecare's systems, containing 318k unique email addresses. Most of the data consisted of B2B sales and marketing records with names, physical addresses, phone numbers, job titles and employers. The data also included a small number of Brazilian health insurance plan members, including dates of birth, genders, marital statuses and CPF numbers (Brazilian taxpayer identification numbers).
06.08.2026 - Fanlore 144.520 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames

In August 2026, the Organization for Transformative Works (OTW) identified unauthorised access to the Fanlore wiki it operates. The breach resulted in the exposure of 145k unique email addresses along with usernames and passwords stored as either MD5 or PBKDF2 hashes. OTW self-submitted the exposed data to HIBP.
05.08.2026 - CyrusOne 373.460 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In August 2026, data centre operator CyrusOne was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The group subsequently published data allegedly obtained from the company, which included 373k unique email addresses across records relating to users, sales leads and CyrusOne employees. The data largely consisted of corporate contact information, including names, physical addresses, phone numbers and job titles. It also included support tickets and other information related to the organisation's operations.
03.08.2026 - Chess.com (2026) 4.653.212 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Geographic locations, Names, Usernames

In August 2026, millions of records allegedly sourced from Chess.com were posted online. The data contained 7.3M rows with 4.6M unique email addresses, along with usernames, names, countries and data relating to users' Chess.com accounts. Analysis of the data suggested it had been obtained by scraping. When loaded into HIBP, 99% of the email addresses had already appeared in previous data breaches, further supporting the scraping theory. Read more about scrapes and data breaches.
01.08.2026 - Alcon 218.395 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In August 2026, the Alcon eye care company was named in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly sourced from Alcon containing 218k unique email addresses along with other largely corporate B2B contact fields, including name, phone number and physical address.
01.08.2026 - Questel 1.226.209 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In August 2026, the French intellectual property software and services company Questel was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published an extensive corpus of data they alleged was obtained from the company, largely comprising corporate contact information associated with sales leads, support cases and marketing activities, with 1.2M unique email addresses. The data also included names, employers and job titles, along with physical addresses and phone numbers.
27.07.2026 - RingCentral 1.596.490 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In July 2026, the cloud-based business communications platform RingCentral was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they claimed was obtained from the platform, which included 1.6M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and phone numbers. In their disclosure notice, RingCentral advised that the incident affected "a limited portion of RingCentral customers" and that it was communicating directly with those affected.
21.07.2026 - SplitVPN 865.336 Datensätze geleaked
Device information, Email addresses, Geographic locations, IP addresses, Partial credit card data

In July 2026, the Russian VPN service SplitVPN (previously known as NotVPN) suffered a data breach. The incident exposed millions of customer records, including 865k unique email addresses. Other impacted data included IP addresses, the user's country, and partial payment card data (first 6 and last 4 digits plus expiry date).
15.07.2026 - Exact Sciences 10.869.543 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Personal health data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In July 2026, Exact Sciences (now owned by Abbott Laboratories) was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group claimed to have obtained data from the company's cancer diagnostics business, which they later published publicly. The breach contained 10.9M unique email addresses belonging to customers, patients and healthcare providers, along with names, addresses, phone numbers and health records. Abbott subsequently published a public notice advising that "some of the impacted files contain personal information and/or personal health information" and that more specific information would follow once their review of the incident was complete. For context, Exact Sciences is the maker of the Cologuard at-home colorectal cancer screening test.
13.07.2026 - Brinks Home 732.162 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases

In July 2026, Brinks Home was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data they alleged was taken from the company, including 732k unique email addresses and other personal information relating to leads, customers and Brinks staff such as name, phone numbers and physical addresses. The data also included purchases from Brinks along with partial credit card data (last 4 digits, card type and expiry). In Brinks' disclosure notice, they acknowledged the incident and risk of disclosure, and advised that they would notify impacted parties "consistent with applicable law".
01.07.2026 - Fluke 821.100 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In July 2026, electronic test and measurement equipment company Fluke was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published more than 100GB of data allegedly taken from the company. The corpus contained largely corporate contact information, including over 800k unique email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A large collection of support cases was also present.
18.06.2026 - Inter-Con Security 276.114 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, Inter-Con Security was targeted in a ShinyHunters “pay or leak” extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data it alleged was taken from the company, including 276k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, job titles and phone numbers. The data encompassed a combination of contacts, internal users and leads.
18.06.2026 - Operation Endgame 4.0 4.348.526 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Passwords

On 18 June 2026, the latest phase of Operation Endgame targeted the SocGholish malware operation, a prolific malware distribution network used to compromise systems and facilitate further cybercrime. Coordinated by international law enforcement agencies with support from Europol and Eurojust, the operation remediated almost 15,000 compromised websites and disrupted more than 100 servers and domains used to distribute malware. Authorities initially provided HIBP with 154k impacted email addresses and more than half a million previously unseen passwords. The following week, a further 4M email addresses and 9M passwords relating to the StealC malware operation also targeted by Operation Endgame were provided, followed by another 131k email addresses the following month, bringing the total to more than 4.3M unique email addresses.
16.06.2026 - Houston City College 831.642 Datensätze geleaked
Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, Houston City College was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from the college was later published publicly and included 832k unique email addresses along with names, addresses, phone numbers, academic records, and other personal information relating to both current students and alumni.
15.06.2026 - Glendale Community College 793.925 Datensätze geleaked
Academic records, Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, Glendale Community College was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from Glendale was later published online and included almost 800k unique email addresses along with various other data fields, including names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers and other information relating to student enrolments. In its disclosure notice, the college advised that "the potentially impacted information may vary for each individual and may include all or just one of the above-listed types of information".
15.06.2026 - June 2026 Stealer Logs 56.278.397 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Passwords

In June 2026, a collection of accumulated stealer logs from various sources was added to HIBP. The corpus comprised 56M unique email addresses across hundreds of millions of stealer log records. The data also contained 124M unique passwords, which have been added to Pwned Passwords and are now searchable. Individuals can view any records captured against their email address in the stealer logs section of their dashboard. Organisations can see logs affecting their domain via the stealer logs API.
15.06.2026 - Moody Bible Institute 2.303.416 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Marital statuses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, Moody Bible Institute was targeted by a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Over 2.3M unique email addresses and other personal data were later published publicly, including names, physical addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and other information relating to donors, supporters, students and alumni. In their disclosure notice, Moody advised that they had "engaged both internal and external cybersecurity experts to thoroughly investigate the matter".
15.06.2026 - Sysco 2.691.852 Datensätze geleaked
Customer feedback, Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Usernames

In June 2026, the food distribution company Sysco was targeted by a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data was subsequently published containing 2.7M unique email addresses belonging to staff and customers. The data also contained largely corporate contact information including names, phone numbers, physical addresses, internal job titles, and customer feedback.
12.06.2026 - American Tower 216.601 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, telecommunications tower infrastructure company American Tower was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published data allegedly taken from the company containing more than 200k unique email addresses belonging to employees, contractors, customers, and leads. Exposed data also included names, addresses, and phone numbers.
12.06.2026 - JCPenney 368.418 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Usernames

In June 2026, retailer JCPenney and associated brands were targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from JCPenney through the exploitation of a critical zero-day vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft was later published publicly. The exposed records indicated they primarily related to internal HR systems and impacted current and former employees. The data included 368k corporate and personal email addresses, names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, phone numbers and home addresses.
11.06.2026 - Ralph Lauren 139.903 Datensätze geleaked
Age groups, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Phone numbers

In June 2026, fashion retailer Ralph Lauren was targeted in a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data they claimed was obtained from the organisation's Salesforce instance, including 140k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, genders and age groups.
09.06.2026 - Goose Creek 6.574.121 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases

In June 2026, a party claiming to have access to data from Goose Creek Candle Company sent emails to a number of the company's customers, claiming the company had a security vulnerability and suffered a data breach. The data was subsequently sent to Have I Been Pwned and contained 6.6M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses, order IDs and total spent. The data appears to have been obtained from the company's Shopify instance. Goose Creek is aware of the reports but was unable to provide Have I Been Pwned with any further information at the time of publication.
09.06.2026 - University of Nottingham 454.635 Datensätze geleaked
Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth, Disabilities, Email addresses, Ethnicities, Genders, IP addresses, Names, Passport numbers, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations, Usernames

In June 2026, the University of Nottingham was the target of a cyber attack, later linked to a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Tens of gigabytes of data were subsequently published online and included 455k unique email addresses along with extensive personal information including names, addresses, phone numbers, ethnicities, disabilities, passport numbers and information relating to academic enrolments and fee payments. In a post about the incident, the university advised that the breach affected both "current students, and alumni".
05.06.2026 - Madison Square Garden Sports 9.796.738 Datensätze geleaked
Customer service records, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In June 2026, the sports and entertainment company Madison Square Garden Sports was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the alleged data, which included almost 10M unique email addresses spanning staff and customers, along with extensive personal, employment and customer relationship information.
30.05.2026 - Atlas Menu 63.926 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords, Support tickets, Usernames

In May 2026, the GTA V and CS2 cheat service Atlas Menu suffered a data breach. An attacker claimed to have gained access to all Atlas systems and published the service's database to a public GitHub repository. The incident exposed 64k unique email addresses along with usernames, IP addresses, support tickets and passwords stored as bcrypt hashes.
29.05.2026 - BCD Travel 396.313 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In May 2026, the corporate travel management company BCD Travel was claimed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign. Data allegedly obtained from BCD was subsequently published publicly in early June and contained 396k unique email addresses. Other exposed data included names, addresses, phone numbers, job titles and employer names, spanning a variety of different data sets including leads, internal staff and support tickets.
23.05.2026 - Baker Distributing 102.935 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In May 2026, the HVAC/R wholesale distributor Baker Distributing Company was added to the ShinyHunters data extortion group's "pay or leak" site. In early June, the group publicly published data they claimed had been obtained from Baker's SharePoint and Salesforce infrastructure including 103k unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses, phone numbers and tickets relating to the company's HVAC contractor customer base. The exposed data was largely corporate contact and support information with limited sensitivity.
23.05.2026 - Charter 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated.
23.05.2026 - DentaQuest 2.553.599 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Health insurance information, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In May 2026, the dental benefits administrator DentaQuest was the target of a ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion campaign that resulted in the group publicly publishing hundreds of gigabytes of data allegedly obtained from the company. The data included 2.6M unique email addresses along with names, addresses and phone numbers. Much of the data appeared in healthcare enrollment files (ASC X12 transaction sets) with some containing Medicaid IDs, while additional data appeared in member records and related files. DentaQuest acknowledged "a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to a limited portion of our network", and advised they had contained the attack and mitigated the threat.
16.05.2026 - Gîtes de France 117.574 Datensätze geleaked
Booking details, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In May 2026, the French holiday rental network Gîtes de France suffered a data breach affecting some of its departmental branches. The incident exposed hundreds of thousands of customer records, including 118k unique email addresses alongside names, phone numbers, postal addresses and booking details.
14.05.2026 - Golf Canada 568.972 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Names, Usernames

In mid-2026, hundreds of thousands of user records allegedly sourced from Golf Canada began circulating via Telegram. The data included 569k unique email addresses along with names, usernames, dates of birth, genders and approximate geographic locations (city, province and postcode). It remains unclear whether the data was obtained via unintentionally exposed website features or a security vulnerability.
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