Beratung zu IT-Sicherheit & Datenschutz


Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung beziehungsweise das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz betreffen uns alle - jeder, der Daten von Dritten erfasst, speichert oder verarbeitet muss den europäischen Standard einhalten. Die umfangreichen Gesetzestexte regeln Rechte und Pflichten aber auch technische und organisatorische Maßnahmen zum Datenschutz, Aufbewahrungspflichten, Sicherheitsstandards und Vorgaben zur Dokumentation von Verfahren und Vorfällen sowie die Vorgaben zur Berufung eines Datenschutzbeauftragten mit einer besonderen Aufsichts- und Beratungspflicht.

Die DSGVO und das BDSG sollte dabei nicht nur schriftlich in langen Rechtstexten, Datenschutzhinweisen und Verfahrensdokumentationen umgesetzt werden sondern es sollten konkrete technische Standards etabliert und eingehalten werden um dem Verlust von Daten vorzubeugen, der unberechtigten Nutzung von Daten einhalt zu gebieten und Angreifer und Hacker zuverlässig abzuwehren.

Da umfangreiches Know-How sowohl im Bezug auf die Rechtsgrundlagen als auch auf die technischen Risiken und Möglichkeiten erforderlich sind um ein angemessenes Datenschutzkonzept zu etablieren haben viele Unternehmen große Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung. Unsere IT- und Datenschutzberatung setzt hier an - mit unserer Expertise können wir Sie dabei unterstützen Datenschutz technisch und rechtlich angemessen umzusetzen.
Wir unterstützen Sie gerne! »

  Unsere Leistungen

Datenschutzberatung durch geprüften DSB
Umsetzung von IT-Richtlinien / Gesetzen
Analyse & Beratung zur IT-Sicherheit
Erstellung von Dokumentationen



Was steckt dahinter?

Das "Who is Who" - DSGVO, GDPR, BDSG, TMG, ...
Innerhalb der EU gilt seit 2018 die sogenannte General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), die in Deutschland unter der Bezeichnung "Datenschutz-Grundverordnung" (DSGVO) in nationales Recht umgesetzt wurde. Das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) präzisiert die Regelungen der DSGVO und fügt weitere nationale Regelungen hinzu. Für Betreiber von Internetangeboten ist zudem das Telemediengesetzes (TMG) relevant. Dies bezieht sich allerdings weniger auf den Datenschutz als auf grundlegende Regelungen im IT-Recht.

Was ist Datenschutzberatung?
Unser TÜV geprüfter Datenschutzbeauftragter mit juristischer Qualifikation berät Sie gerne zu Fragen rund um die Umsetzung von Datenschutzrecht in Ihren konkreten Projekten. Darüber hinausgehende zivilrechtliche Fragestellungen hingegen fallen nicht in den Bereich der Datenschutzberatung.




Die rechtliche Seite: DSGVO

Die DSGVO beziehungsweise das Bundesdatenschutzgesetz stellen verschiedene Forderungen an Unternehmen und Organisationen die zwingend einzuhalten sind um rechtskonform Daten zu verarbeiten. Als Verarbeiter von Daten zählen Sie schon dann, wenn Sie die Daten von Mitarbeitenden oder Kunden erfassen oder speichern.

Damit gilt die DSGVO sowohl für Kleinstunternehmen und Vereine wie auch für große Unternehmen und global Player.

Während die gesetzlichen Regelungen in vielen Bereichen sehr präzise Vorgaben machen welche Dokumente und Verfahren es geben muss und welche Rechte, Pflichten und Fristen gelten, gibt es in vielen Bereichen auch große Unsicherheiten. Häufiger werden Maßnahmen gefordert die sich am Stand der Technik orientieren oder technische Notwendigkeit und Machbarkeit zur Maßgabe machen.

Im Rahmen einer rechtlichen Datenschutzberatung geht es darum Sie über Ihre Rechte und Pflichten als Datenverarbeiter zu informieren und gemeinsam zu prüfen und sicherzustellen, dass die geforderten Unterlagen und Prozesse korrekt umgesetzt werden. Wir zeigen Ihnen gernen auch Tools und Best Practices zur Umsetzung der Rechte Betroffener und Ihrer Pflichten als Verarbeiter.

Wir unterstützen Sie dabei den Überblick zu bewahren!

Die technische Seite: IT-Sicherheit

Während die rechtliche Seite sich viel mit Fragen nach Rechten und Pflichten, der Haftung und der Verantwortung beschäftigt, ist die technische Seite des Datenschutzes sehr viel präziser:

Wie verhindern Sie, dass Ihre Daten in falsche Hände kommen?

Sie sammeln und verarbeiten vermutlich jeden Tag Daten von Dritten und speichern diese in internen Tools, verarbeiten sie auf Ihren oder fremden Servern, übertragen Sie zu Dienstleistern oder bauen sogar einen wesentlichen Teil Ihrer Tätigkeit auf der Verarbeitung auf.

Ein potentieller Angreifer oder Hacker versucht stets den schwächsten Punkt zu identifizieren, um Zugriff zu Ihren Daten zu erlangen. Häufig nutzen Hacker dazu bekannte Sicherheitslücken nicht aktualisierter Systeme aus, suchen nach vergessenen oder auch versehentlich offen stehenden Türen oder greifen sensible Zugangsdaten ab, wodurch sie auch ohne große Anstrengungen unberechtigten Zugang erlangen und viel Schaden anrichten können. Dabei müssen Sie nichtmal das primäre Ziel des Angriffs sein, sondern könnten vermeintlich auch Opfer eines größer angelegten Angriffs auf mehrere Unternehmen werden.

Wir unterstützen Sie dabei, ein Sicherheitskonzept in Ihrer IT zu etablieren und die Angriffflächen zu reduzieren.





IT-Sicherheit - bleiben Sie auf dem Laufenden


Täglich werden neue Schwachstellen, Angriffs-Vektoren, Cyber-Attaken und Fehler in Software, Netzwerken und Infrastrukturen bekannt - teilweise betreffen diese nur bestimmte Softwarelösungen oder spezifische Szenarien, manchmal betreffen Sie jedoch auch ganze Industriezweige, weit verbreitete Arbeitsweisen und grundlegende Technologien wie bei Heartbleed (SSL) oder Log4Shell (Protokollierung). Ergreifen Sie Maßnahmen, um Ihre Infrastruktur und Daten sicher zu halten.

Gemeinsam erfassen wir, welche Komponten und Abhängigkeiten Sie einsetzen und überwachen die CVE und viele weitere Quellen um im Falle von Mängeln oder Angriffspunkten schnell handeln zu können.

Wir simulieren Angriffe und Testen Ihre Anwendungen, Webseiten, die Infrastruktur und Prozesse auf mögliche Sicherheitslücken, Mängel und Angriffsvektoren um Risiken fürhzeitig zu erknennen und Lücken zu schließen.

Wir implementieren aktiv Monitore und überwachen somit Anfragen um frühzeitig Angriffe und verdächtige Aktivitäten zu identifizieren. Verdächte Aktivitäten können zur Alarmierung oder zu automatischen Sperrungen und Ausschlüssen führen, um einen hohen Standard zu gewährleisten.


Den Bedrohungen der IT-Welt sind Sie nicht schutzlos ausgeliefert - es ist jedoch wichtig dem Thema IT-Sicherheit Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken, um einen verantwortungsbewussten und rechtskonformen Umgang mit Unternehmens- und Kundendaten zu gewährleisten.
Risiko / Label Veröffentlichung
Risiko 2 / 10 CVE-2026-10116 vor 1 Stunde(n)
A security flaw has been discovered in Open5GS up to 2.7.7. This vulnerability affects the function ogs_sbi_xact_add in the library /lib/core/ogs-timer.c of the component ue-authentications Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in denial of service. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue.
Risiko 2 / 10 CVE-2026-10115 vor 2 Stunde(n)
A vulnerability was identified in Open5GS up to 2.7.7. This affects an unknown part in the library lib/sbi/nnrf-handler.c of the component Shared NF-profile Parser. Such manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue.
Risiko 2 / 10 CVE-2026-10114 vor 2 Stunde(n)
A vulnerability was determined in Open5GS up to 2.7.7. Affected by this issue is the function handle_scp_info in the library lib/sbi/nnrf-handler.c of the component Shared NF-profile Parser. This manipulation causes out-of-bounds write. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-7465 vor 3 Stunde(n)
The Spectra Gutenberg Blocks – Website Builder for the Block Editor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 2.19.25. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. Exploitation requires a two-block payload embedded in post content: the first block registers a fake uagb/-prefixed block type with an attacker-specified render_callback, and the second block of the same fake type triggers invocation of that callback via call_user_func() during sequential block rendering in the same page request.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-9757 vor 3 Stunde(n)
The GEO my WP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'swlatlng' and 'nelatlng' parameters in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.5 The parameters are read from $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'] via parse_str() (bypassing WordPress's wp_magic_quotes protection, which only covers $_POST/$_GET/$_COOKIE/$_REQUEST), then each is split on ',' via explode() and the resulting fragments are interpolated directly into a SQL BETWEEN clause in gmw_get_locations_within_boundaries_sql() without is_numeric() validation, (float) casting, esc_sql(), or $wpdb->prepare(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the site to host the Posts Locator search-results shortcode (`[gmw form="results" form_id=N]`) on a public page and to have at least one published post with an associated gmw_location row.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-7459 vor 3 Stunde(n)
The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events//react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46238 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: stop caching unowned originator pointers in BAT IV BAT IV keeps the last-hop neighbor address in each neigh_node, but some paths also cache an originator pointer derived from a temporary lookup. That pointer is not owned by the neigh_node and may no longer refer to a live originator entry after purge handling runs. Stop storing the auxiliary originator pointer in the BAT IV neighbor state. When BAT IV needs the neighbor originator data, resolve it from the stored neighbor address and drop the reference again after use. [sven: avoid bonding logic for outgoing OGM]
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46240 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: iris: Fix use-after-free in iris_release_internal_buffers() The recent change in commit 1dabf00ee206 ("media: iris: gen1: Destroy internal buffers after FW releases") introduced a regression where session_release_buf() may free the buffer. The caller, iris_release_internal_buffers(), continued to access `buffer` after the call, leading to a potential use-after-free. Fix this by setting BUF_ATTR_PENDING_RELEASE before calling session_release_buf(), and reverting the flag if the call fails. This ensures no dereference occurs after potential freeing.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46237 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn3: Avoid overflow on msg bound check As pointed out by SDL, the previous condition may be vulnerable to overflow. (cherry picked from commit db00257ac9e4a51eb2515aaea161a019f7125e10)
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46227 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the lock is dropped. sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *). Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer. Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop bails before the re-derive. The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc safely") was added for.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46230 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn3: Prevent OOB reads when parsing dec msg Check bounds against the end of the BO whenever we access the msg.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46232 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: playstation: Clamp num_touch_reports A device would never lie about the number of touch reports would it? If it does the loop in dualshock4_parse_report will read off the end of the touch_reports array, up to about 2 KiB for the maximum number of 256 loop iteraions. The data that is read is emitted via evdev if the DS4_TOUCH_POINT_INACTIVE bit happens to be set. Protect against this by clamping the num_touch_reports value provided by the device to the maximum size of the touch_reports array.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46218 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add bounds checking to ib_{get,set}_value The uvd/vce/vcn code accesses the IB at predefined offsets without checking that the IB is large enough. Check the bounds here. The caller is responsible for making sure it can handle arbitrary return values. Also make the idx a uint32_t to prevent overflows causing the condition to fail.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46215 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in change_handle There was a potential race condition in change_handle. The ioctl briefly had a single object with two idr entries; a concurrent gem_close could delete the object and remove one of the handles while leaving the other one dangling, which could subsequently be dereferenced for a use-after-free. To fix this, do the same dance that gem_close itself does. (f6cd7daecff5 drm: Release driver references to handle before making it available again) First idr_replace the old handle to NULL. Later, if the prime operations are successful, actually close it. create_tail required a similar dance to avoid a similar problem. (bd46cece51a3 drm/gem: Fix race in drm_gem_handle_create_tail()) It idr_allocs the new handle with NULL, then swaps in the correct object later to avoid races. We don't need to do that here, since the only operations that could race are drm_prime, and change_handle holds the prime lock for the entire duration. v2: cleanups of error paths
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46210 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: iris: fix use-after-free of fmt_src during MBPF check During concurrency testing, multiple instances can run in parallel, and each instance uses its own inst->lock while the core->lock protects the list of active instances. The race happens because these locks cover different scopes, inst->lock protects only the internals of a single instance, while the Macro Blocks Per Frame (MBPF) checker walks the core list under core->lock and reads fields like fmt_src->width and fmt_src->height. At the same time, iris_close() may free fmt_src and fmt_dst under inst->lock while the instance is still present in the core list. This allows a situation where the MBPF checker, still iterating through the core list, reaches an instance whose fmt_src was already freed by another thread and ends up dereferencing a dangling pointer, resulting in a use-after-free. This happens because the MBPF checker assumes that any instance in the core list is fully valid, but the freeing of fmt_src and fmt_dst without removing the instance from the core list is not correct. The correct ordering is to defer freeing fmt_src and fmt_dst until after the instance has been removed from the core list and all teardown under the core lock has completed, ensuring that no dangling pointers are ever exposed during MBPF checks.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46209 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions using plain integer division: unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1); unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1); However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations. For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int, causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's bounds. Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width() and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match the calculation already used in framebuffer_check().
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46212 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: bla: prevent use-after-free when deleting claims When batadv_bla_del_backbone_claims() removes all claims for a backbone, it does this by dropping the link entry in the hash list. This list entry itself was one of the references which need to be dropped at the same time via batadv_claim_put(). But the batadv_claim_put() must not be done before the last access to the claim object in this function. Otherwise the claim might be freed already by the batadv_claim_release() function before the list entry was dropped.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46199 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn4: Prevent OOB reads when parsing dec msg Check bounds against the end of the BO whenever we access the msg.
Risiko 9.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46195 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security descriptor. On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths. Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46190 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show() Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1]. In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names). Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total number of bytes occupied by the pointers (element_count * sizeof(void *)) rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the passed length 8x larger than intended. Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count but is within the inflated byte-size count. Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of string pointers in the array.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46174 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/CPU/AMD: Prevent improper isolation of shared resources in Zen2's op cache Make sure resources are not improperly shared in the op cache and cause instruction corruption this way.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46178 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq() Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free().
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46175 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by FGGC of node block During FGGC node block migration, fsck may incorrectly treat the migrated node block as fsync-written data. The reproduction scenario: root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# seq 1 2048 | xargs -n 1 ./test_sync // write inline inode and sync root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# rm -f 1 root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# sync root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# f2fs_io gc_range // move data block in sync mode and not write CP SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set The root cause is that GC does not clear the dentry mark and fsync mark during node block migration, leading fsck to misinterpret them as user-issued fsync writes. In BGGC mode, node block migration is handled by f2fs_sync_node_pages(), which guarantees the dentry and fsync marks are cleared before writing. This patch move the set/clear of the fsync|dentry marks into __write_node_folio to make the logic clearer, and ensures the fsync|dentry mark is cleared in FGGC.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46164 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info_sub_group() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info_sub_group() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&sub_group->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(sub_group) Then control returns to create_space_info_sub_group(), where: btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> kfree(sub_group) Thus, sub_group is freed twice. Keep parent->sub_group[index] = NULL for the failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46154 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Read scx_root under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem in cgroup setters scx_group_set_{weight,idle,bandwidth}() cache scx_root before acquiring scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem, so the pointer can be stale by the time the op runs. If the loaded scheduler is disabled and freed (via RCU work) and another is enabled between the naked load and the rwsem acquire, the reader sees scx_cgroup_enabled=true (the new scheduler's) but dereferences the freed one - UAF on SCX_HAS_OP(sch, ...) / SCX_CALL_OP(sch, ...). scx_cgroup_enabled is toggled only under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem write (scx_cgroup_{init,exit}), so reading scx_root inside the rwsem read section correlates @sch with the enabled snapshot.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46149 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46138 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis before the array access. When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG, or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle() rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(), creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held. Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup properly.
Risiko 7.5 / 10 CVE-2026-46125 vor 2 Tag(en)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is already being removed, so that doesn't need changes. This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs.

Das "CVE"-Repository (eng. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) stellt eine Liste bekannter Schwachstellen und Sicherheitslücken in IT-Systemen unter Führung des "US-amerikanischen National Cybersecurity" zusammen und bewertet diese anhand Ihres Risikos auf einer Skala von eins bis zehn.


Gerade im Bereich von Web-Technologien und Cloud-Software werden regelmäßig Hacks und Sicherheitslücken bekannt. Die betroffenen Unternehmen erleiden in der Regel nicht nur einen Image-Schaden sondern stehen womöglich gegenüber Ihren Kunden auch in der rechtlichen Verantwortung. Das Projekt "Have I Been Pwned" sammelt seit Jahren Daten die aus Hacks oder Datenlecks öffentlich zugänglich werden und bietet einen Service um zu prüfen, ob man selbst von diesen Hacks betroffen wurde.

23.05.2026 - Charter 4.851.517 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In May 2026, the telecommunications company Charter Communications (the parent company behind the consumer broadband and cable brand Spectrum) was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group later published the data, which exposed 4.9M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of approximately 85k records originating from an internal employee directory also included job titles. Charter confirmed the incident, but stated that no sensitive personal information or customer proprietary network information (CPNI) was exfiltrated.
05.05.2026 - Cushman & Wakefield 310.431 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations

In May 2026, the real estate services firm Cushman & Wakefield was the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. Following the threat, the group publicly published data they alleged had been obtained from the firm, consisting mostly of C&W email addresses along with tens of thousands of external email addresses and corporate contact records. The exposed data was primarily business information, including names, job titles, company addresses and phone numbers.
30.04.2026 - Reborn Gaming 126 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, IP addresses

In April 2026, the gaming community Reborn Gaming suffered a data breach due to a vulnerability in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM). The breach exposed 126 unique email addresses along with IP addresses and Steam IDs. Reborn Gaming self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned.
28.04.2026 - Vimeo 119.167 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names

In April 2026, the ShinyHunters extortion group listed Vimeo on their extortion portal as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. They subsequently published hundreds of gigabytes of data, predominantly consisting of video titles, technical data and metadata. The data also included 119k unique email addresses, sometimes accompanied by names. Vimeo attributed the exposure to a breach of Anodot, a third-party analytics vendor, and advised the incident does not include "Vimeo video content, valid user login credentials, or payment card information".
26.04.2026 - CTT 468.124 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers

In April 2026, data allegedly obtained from CTT, Portugal's national postal service, was posted to a public hacking forum. The data included 468k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and parcel tracking numbers which can be used to retrieve the tracking history of the parcel.
24.04.2026 - Udemy 1.401.259 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Payment methods, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, online training company Udemy was the victim of a “pay or leak” extortion attempt perpetrated by the ShinyHunters group. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained 1.4M unique email addresses belonging to customers and instructors. The data also included names, physical addresses, phone numbers, employer information and instructor payout methods including PayPal, cheque and bank transfer.
20.04.2026 - ADT 5.488.888 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Partial government issued IDs, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, home security firm ADT confirmed a data breach by ShinyHunters, which listed the company on its website as part of a "pay or leak" extortion attempt. The breach impacted 5.5M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. ADT also advised that "in a small percentage of cases, dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs were included" and that it had contacted all affected people.
20.04.2026 - Aman 215.563 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Language preferences, Names, Nationalities, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Spouses names, VIP statuses

In April 2026, the ultra-luxury hotel brand Aman was named by ShinyHunters as the target of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign, with the data allegedly obtained from their Salesforce CRM. The data was subsequently leaked publicly and contained over 200k unique email addresses. Whilst not present on all records, the data also included genders, physical addresses, phone numbers, nationalities, dates of birth, spouse names and VIP status codes.
20.04.2026 - Canada Life 237.810 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Salutations, Support tickets

In April 2026, Canada Life was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by the ShinyHunters group. The group subsequently published the data which contained over 200k unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and, in some cases, customer support tickets. In their disclosure notice, Canada Life advised that "it is a small proportion of our customers who may have been impacted". In the wake of the incident, Canada Life also published an alert cautioning customers to be wary of phishing attacks, a pattern often seen after the public release of breached data.
20.04.2026 - Pitney Bowes 8.243.989 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, the hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed to have obtained data from Pitney Bowes as part of a broader extortion campaign that also named several other organisations. After negotiations allegedly failed, the group publicly released the data which included 8.2M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and physical addresses. A subset of the data also included Pitney Bowes employee records with job titles.
18.04.2026 - Carnival 7.531.359 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Loyalty program details, Names, Salutations

In April 2026, the notorious hacking collective ShinyHunters claimed they had obtained a substantial volume of data belonging to the Carnival cruise operator and attempted to extort the organisation to prevent the data from being leaked. The following week, the group published the data publicly, which contained 8.7M records with 7.5M unique email addresses. The data contained fields indicating it related to the Mariner Society loyalty program run by Holland America, a cruise line brand under Carnival, and included names, dates of birth, genders and data relating to status within the loyalty program. Carnival acknowledged a phishing incident involving a single user account and advised they were working to better understand the scope of the unauthorised activity.
15.04.2026 - Kemper 269.299 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases

In April 2026, the American insurance holding company Kemper Corporation was named by the ShinyHunters ransomware group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The attackers allegedly accessed Kemper's Salesforce environment via social engineering as part of a broader campaign targeting hundreds of organisations using the same method. The group later published tens of gigabytes of data they claimed included internal directory data, Salesforce records and Stripe payment logs. Among the 269k unique email addresses were names, phone numbers, physical addresses and partial payment card data including the last 4 digits, expiry dates and card brands. Kemper confirmed the incident and stated they had engaged third-party cybersecurity experts and notified law enforcement.
15.04.2026 - Zara 197.376 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Geographic locations, Purchases, Support tickets

In April 2026, the fashion brand Zara was among a number of organisations targeted by the ShinyHunters extortion group as part of their "pay or leak" campaign. The group claimed the breach was related to a compromise of the Anodot analytics platform and subsequently published a terabyte of data allegedly including 95M support ticket records. The data contained 197k unique email addresses alongside product SKUs, order IDs and the market the support ticket originated in. Zara's parent company Inditex advised that the incident didn't affect passwords or payment information.
14.04.2026 - Abrigo 711.099 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, the fintech software company Abrigo was targeted in a "pay or leak" extortion attempt by the ShinyHunters group. Shortly after, data allegedly taken from the company's Salesforce instance was published publicly and contained over 700k unique email addresses belonging to both Abrigo staff and external contacts. Whilst separate from Abrigo's Salesforce compromise via the Drift application connector the previous year, the data fields described in that incident are consistent with the ShinyHunters data, namely that it was "business contact information" including "institution name, employee name, email addresses, and phone numbers".
12.04.2026 - Marcus & Millichap 1.837.078 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, the commercial real estate brokerage firm Marcus & Millichap was named as one of multiple alleged victims of the ShinyHunters hacking and extortion group. Data alleged to have been obtained from the company was subsequently released publicly and included 1.8M unique email addresses, along with names, phone numbers and employment-related information including employer, job title and physical company address. In their disclosure notice, Marcus & Millichap advised that data which may have been accessed appeared limited to "company forms, templates, marketing materials, and general contact information".
12.04.2026 - Mytheresa 84.108 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Partial credit card data, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Salutations

In April 2026, the luxury fashion e-commerce platform Mytheresa was listed as a victim of the ShinyHunters "pay or leak" extortion group. After the ransom deadline passed, the group publicly released the data which contained 84k unique email addresses. The exposed data also included names, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchases and partial credit card data including card type, last 4 digits and expiry date.
10.04.2026 - McGraw Hill 13.500.136 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, education company McGraw Hill confirmed a data breach following an extortion attempt. Attributed to a Salesforce misconfiguration, the company stated the incident exposed "a limited set of data from a webpage hosted by Salesforce on its platform". More than 100GB of data was later publicly distributed, containing 13.5M unique email addresses across multiple files, with additional fields such as name, physical address and phone number appearing inconsistently across some records.
08.04.2026 - 7-Eleven 185.256 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In April 2026, 7-Eleven was the victim of a "pay or leak" extortion campaign by ShinyHunters, with the data later published that month. The incident exposed 185k unique email addresses, along with names, physical addresses, dates of birth and phone numbers. A small number of records also contained additional exposed data fields. The company later advised the breach was limited to "certain 7-Eleven systems used to store franchisee documents", a statement consistent with the exposed data.
07.04.2026 - My Lovely AI 106.271 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Social media profiles

In April 2026, the NSFW AI girlfriend platform My Lovely AI suffered a data breach that exposed over 100k users. The data included user-created prompts and links to the resulting AI-generated images, along with a small number of Discord and X usernames.
06.04.2026 - LegionProxy 10.144 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Purchases

In April 2026, the commercial residential and ISP proxy network LegionProxy suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 10k email addresses, bcrypt password hashes, names and purchases.
03.04.2026 - Amtrak 2.147.679 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In April 2026, the hacking group ShinyHunters claimed they had breached Amtrak. The group typically compromises organisations' Salesforce instances before demanding a ransom and later, if not paid, dumping the data publicly. They subsequently published the alleged data which contained over 2M unique email addresses along with names, physical addresses and customer support records.
02.04.2026 - SongTrivia2 291.739 Datensätze geleaked
Auth tokens, Avatars, Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames

In April 2026, the music trivia platform SongTrivia2 suffered a data breach that was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The data contained a total of 291k unique email addresses sourced from either Google OAuth logins or accounts created on the site, the latter also containing bcrypt password hashes. The data also included names, usernames and avatars.
31.03.2026 - Hallmark 1.736.520 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Support tickets

In March 2026, Hallmark suffered an alleged breach and subsequent extortion after attackers gained access to data stored within Salesforce. The data was later published after the extortion deadline passed, exposing 1.7M unique email addresses across both Hallmark and the Hallmark+ streaming service, along with names, phone numbers, physical addresses and support tickets.
27.03.2026 - ZenBusiness 5.118.184 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers

In March 2026, the hacker and extortion group "ShinyHunters" claimed to have obtained a substantial corpus of data from ZenBusiness, a business formation and compliance platform. The group claimed the data had been exfiltrated from platforms including Snowflake, Mixpanel and Salesforce, and threatened to publish it if a ransom was not paid. The following month, after claiming payment had not been made, ShinyHunters publicly released the data. The collection amounted to many terabytes across thousands of files that appeared to originate from multiple systems and business functions, including leads, support records and other CRM-related data. The data contained approximately 5M unique email addresses, often accompanied by name and phone number depending on the source file.
26.03.2026 - BreachForums Version 5 339.778 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames

In March 2026, a breach of one of the many iterations of the BreachForums hacking forum known as "Version 5" was publicly disclosed. The incident exposed 340k unique email addresses along with usernames and argon2 password hashes.
25.03.2026 - Addi 34.532.941 Datensätze geleaked
Age groups, Credit scores, Device information, Email addresses, Government issued IDs, Income levels, IP addresses, Latitude and longitude pairs, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases, Socioeconomic levels

In March 2026, the Colombian fintech company Addi identified unauthorised activity on its platform and advised customers that "it is possible that your personal information may have been compromised". The "pay or leak" extortion group ShinyHunters subsequently claimed responsibility and published a large trove of personal data allegedly obtained from Addi. The data included 34M unique email addresses from credit scoring requests, credit bureau records, customer identity records and email validation logs. It also contained government issued IDs (Cédula de Ciudadanía), estimated income, socioeconomic levels, purchases and other credit-related data points.
25.03.2026 - Sound Radix 292.993 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Passwords

In March 2026, the audio production tools company Sound Radix disclosed a data breach that they subsequently self-submitted to HIBP. The incident impacted 293k unique email addresses and names. Sound Radix advised that it is possible that additional data including hashed passwords may have been exposed, and that no financial or credit card information was impacted.
13.03.2026 - Divine Skins 105.814 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Purchases, Usernames

In March 2026, the League of Legends custom skins service Divine Skins suffered a data breach. The incident was disclosed via the service's Discord server, where Divine Skins stated that an unauthorised third party accessed part of its systems, deleted all skins from the database and exposed email addresses and usernames. The data also contained a history of purchases made by users.
12.03.2026 - Crunchyroll 1.195.684 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses

In March 2026, the anime streaming service Crunchyroll suffered a data breach alleged to have impacted 6.8M users. The exposed data is reported to have originated from the company's Zendesk support system where "name, login name, email address, IP address, general geographic location and the contents of the support tickets" were exposed. A subset of 1.2M email addresses from an alleged 2M record dataset being sold was later provided to HIBP.
08.03.2026 - Baydöner 1.266.822 Datensätze geleaked
Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Geographic locations, Government issued IDs, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Purchases

In March 2026, the Turkish restaurant chain Baydöner suffered a data breach which was subsequently published to a public hacking forum. The incident exposed over 1.2M unique email addresses along with names, phone numbers, cities of residence and plaintext passwords. A small number of records also included Turkish national ID number and date of birth. In their disclosure notice, Baydöner stated that payment and financial data was not affected.
06.03.2026 - Aura 903.080 Datensätze geleaked
Customer service comments, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In March 2026, the online safety service Aura disclosed a data breach that exposed 900k unique email addresses. The data was primarily associated with a marketing tool from a previously acquired company, with fewer than 20k active Aura customers affected. Exposed data included names, phone numbers, physical and IP addresses, and customer service notes. Aura advised that no Social Security numbers, passwords or financial information were compromised.
04.03.2026 - SUCCESS 253.510 Datensätze geleaked
Device information, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, Purchases

In March 2026, the personal development and achievement media brand SUCCESS suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 250k unique email addresses along with names, IP addresses, phone numbers and, for a limited number of staff members, bcrypt password hashes. The data also included orders containing physical addresses and the payment method used. In SUCCESS' disclosure notice, they advised their system had also been abused to send offensive newsletters with quotes falsely attributed to contributors.
04.03.2026 - Woflow 447.593 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In March 2026, the AI-driven merchant data platform Woflow was named as a victim by the ShinyHunters data extortion group. The group subsequently published tens of thousands of files allegedly obtained from the company, comprising more than 2TB of data. The trove included hundreds of thousands of email addresses, names, phone numbers and physical addresses, with the data indicating it related to Woflow customers and, in turn, the customers of merchants using their platform.
02.03.2026 - Ameriprise 502.597 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Employers, Financial transactions, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In March 2026, the financial services firm Ameriprise Financial was named by the ShinyHunters group in a "pay or leak" extortion campaign. The group claimed possession of more than 200GB of compressed data exfiltrated from Ameriprise's Salesforce environment and internal SharePoint infrastructure, and subsequently published the data after negotiations allegedly failed. The published data contained 500k unique email addresses as well as names, phone numbers, physical addresses and employer information. In their disclosure to state attorneys general, Ameriprise reported 47,876 affected people; the larger email address population represents contacts from Ameriprise's broader operational systems, including internal staff. Ameriprise further advised that they have "implemented heightened monitoring of your account(s) to include enhanced identity verification procedures".
25.02.2026 - KomikoAI 1.060.191 Datensätze geleaked
AI prompts, Email addresses, Forum posts, Names

In February, the AI-powered comic generation platform KomikoAI suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 1M unique email addresses along with names, user posts and the AI prompts used to generate content. The exposed data enables the mapping of individual AI prompts to specific email addresses.
25.02.2026 - Lovora 495.556 Datensätze geleaked
Display names, Email addresses, Profile photos

In February 2026, the couples and relationship app Lovora allegedly suffered a data breach that exposed 496k unique email addresses. The data also included users’ display names and profile photos, along with other personal information collected through use of the app. The app’s maker, Plantake, did not respond to multiple attempts to contact them about the incident.
17.02.2026 - Quitbro 22.874 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, Partial dates of birth, Usernames

In February 2026, the porn addiction app Quitbro allegedly suffered a data breach that exposed 23k unique email addresses. The data also included users’ years of birth, responses to questions within the app and their last recorded relapse time. The app’s maker, Plantake, did not respond to multiple attempts to contact them about the incident.
14.02.2026 - CarGurus 12.461.887 Datensätze geleaked
Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In February 2026, the automotive marketplace CarGurus was the target of a data breach attributed to the threat actor ShinyHunters. Following an attempted extortion, the data was published publicly and contained more than 12M email addresses across multiple files including user account ID mappings, finance pre-qualification application data and dealer account and subscription information. Impacted data also included names, phone numbers, physical and IP addresses, and auto finance application outcomes.
12.02.2026 - Odido 6.077.025 Datensätze geleaked
Bank account numbers, Customer service comments, Dates of birth, Driver's licenses, Email addresses, Genders, Government issued IDs, Names, Passport numbers, Phone numbers, Physical addresses

In February 2026, Dutch telco Odido was the victim of a data breach and subsequent extortion attempt. Shortly after, a total of 6M unique email addresses were published across four separate data releases over consecutive days. The exposed data includes names, physical addresses, phone numbers, bank account numbers, dates of birth, customer service notes and passport, driver’s licence and European national ID numbers. Odido has published a disclosure notice including an FAQ to support affected customers.
06.02.2026 - Toy Battles 1.017 Datensätze geleaked
Chat logs, Email addresses, IP addresses, Usernames

In February 2026, the online gaming community Toy Battles suffered a data breach. The incident exposed 1k unique email addresses alongside usernames, IP addresses and chat logs. Following the breach, Toy Battles self-submitted the data to Have I Been Pwned.
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